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ABSTRACT

Since its publication in 1516, Thomas More's Utopia

has provoked considerable discussion and debate. Readers

have long grappled with the implications of this text in
order to determine the extent to which More's imaginary

island-nation is intended to be seen as a description of
the ideal commonwealth. While traditional readings have

largely relied upon literal interpretations, and

accordingly have emphasized the significance of Utopia as a
model of the ideal society, this thesis endeavors to

explore beyond the conventional or literal appearance of

More's language to consider the possible meanings,

intentions, and strategies underlying Utopia's elaborate

discourse. While acknowledging its affiliation with

classical philosophy, this investigation will specifically

examine the context of Utopia's production and consider
More's work as an example of humanist, rhetorical

discourse; thus the concentration will be specifically on
the significance of More's use of humor and irony and his

familiarity with the conventions of satiric fiction. By
means of this perspective, we will discover what Utopia has

to reveal about the limitations of idealistic philosophy,
the multifaceted construction of identities, the skillful,
iii

yet subtle, use of wit and irony, the technique of

effective social commentary, and the appreciation and
application of a lively joke and learned jest. Utopia still

retains its status as an extraordinarily enigmatic text,
but we can now recognize its remarkable ability to compel

our contemplation of profoundly serious issues relative to
the intricacies of society and the nature of human action

and behavior, at the very same time that it provokes our
earnest laughter and amusement.
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CHAPTER ONE
"BUT ONLY TO MAKE THAT NEW LAND KNOWN HERE":

THE INVENTION OF UTOPIA

Utopia is a work as complex and multi-faceted as the
man who composed it - Thomas More: lawyer, humanist, family
man, orthodox Catholic, and later councilor to King Henry

VIII. It is difficult to say which of these personae was
the most influential in the production of Utopia; and it is
still more difficult to decide which facets of More's

temperament provide the reader a clear way into the text in

order to determine its fundamental strategies and purposes.
More's vision of an imaginary island-state located at the

far end of the earth qualifies Utopia as a work of
fantastic fiction;.its classical rhetorical structure and
philosophical themes associate Utopia with Plato's treatise
concerning the ideal state in The Republic; and More's
skillfully executed use of humor and irony place Utopia

alongside a contemporary landmark work of Christian
humanism: Erasmus' witty social commentary Encomium Moriae

(In Praise of Folly).

The result is an elaborately

paradoxical and ambiguous work wherein the author's intent

appears to be deliberately mystified. Thomas More
1

effectively composed a work in which the narrative
structure and rhetorical strategies appear to reflect his
own uncertainty or ambivalence about a number of topics,

including politics, society, philosophy, and religion.

In terms of the narrative, Utopia is by no means
complicated. While it includes a combination of elements
from the imaginative fiction and the travel narrative

genres, Utopia is principally a dialogue among three

interlocutors: Raphael Hythloday, whose description of a

remote communalist island-nation provides the subject upon
which More's work is founded; Peter Giles, a friend of

More's, fellow humanist, and native of Antwerp; and "More,"
the narrator who takes it upon himself to record the

afternoon discourse and Hythloday's subsequent description

of Utopia for the ostensible purpose of publishing it.1
Book I is comprised of what has become known as the

humanist debate, or "the dialogue of council," regarding

the question of whether it is better to devote one's life

to civic duty or secluded philosophical contemplation. This
debate then segues into Book II wherein Hythloday proceeds

to offer a discourse concerning "the best state of the

1 I will use "More" to distinguish typographically between More
the historical author and the participant in the dialogue.

2

commonwealth" - using the isle of Utopia as an

illustration. The narrative frame of Utopia opens in

Antwerp where the narrator "More" and his colleague Peter

Giles, after attending mass at the cathedral of Notre Dame,

encounter a stranger. There "More" presents us with his

description of the unfamiliar person: "... a man well
stricken in age, with a black sunburned face, a long beard,
and a cloak cast homely about his shoulders, whom, by his

favor and apparel, forthwith I judged to be a mariner"
(90). The stranger is Raphael Hythloday, a Portuguese

native just returned from a voyage to strange and unknown
places with the Florentine explorer Amerigo Vespucci. And
yet the apparent simplicity of Utopia's structure

notwithstanding, the vast amount of commentary and
criticism produced since its publication in 1516 indicates

that readers have long grappled with the implications of
More's text. Is Utopia meant to be interpreted as a witty

jeu d'esprit that is primarily satiric in its intentions?
Or, is it something more along the lines of a philosophical

or political treatise in which the themes and topics of
discussion are intended to be taken seriously?

The ability of More's text to provoke continuous
debate is based on the consideration of a fundamental

3

question: to what extent is Utopia truly intended to he
seen as a model of the ideal commonwealth? Anyone who

attempts to answer this question solely by way of literal
analysis or interpretation of the text is confronted by the
challenging intricacies of More's work: his incredible
poise as a writer, his vast knowledge of classical

rhetorical forms and narrative structure, and his skillful
execution of language. More's introduction to Utopia

associates his text with such classical works of political
theory as Plato's Republic and The Laws. According to
George Logan, the humanistic interpretations of Utopia that
have relied upon these classical associations have:

... served to establish fundamental guidelines for
the interpretation of the work as a whole, by

proving beyond any reasonable doubt that Utopia
is a careful and essentially serious work, and

that its primary disciplinary affiliation is with
the tradition of political theory.

(Meaning 9)

David Sacks acknowledges a similar view in his introduction

of Utopia: "More explicitly identified his book as a study
of 'the best state of a commonwealth,' placing it in a long

tradition of debate regarding the strengths and

shortcomings of various ideal and real polities" (8). In
4

addition to Utopia's subject matter, the dialogic structure'

of the text and Hythloday's explicit references to Plato

serve to uphold the assessment of Utopia as a work
concerned primarily with philosophy and political theory.2
Yet we are prevented from viewing Utopia strictly in

these terms due to the ubiquitous contradictions evident
throughout the text, which are the result of More's
consistent and subtle use of irony. The most obvious
example of More's irony, as well as his terrific wit, is

found in the very title of his work. For More coined the
term "utopia" from the Greek ou ("no") and topos ("place").
If we take this meaning seriously, then "More's"
presentation of Hythloday's discourse concerning "the best
state of a commonwealth" contains the description of a "no

place" - a nation that can be found to exist "nowhere."
Further instances of irony and contradiction can be

recognized in the names of characters or places:
"Hythloday" is Greek for "speaker/peddler of nonsense."
The name of the main tributary that runs through "Amaurote"
(dark city), Utopia's principal city, is called the

"Anyder," another Greekism which, when translated, means

2 See Sacks, Utopia, 90, 114, and 122-24 for Raphael's use of
Plato's concepts as support for his own argument.
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"without water." Utopia not only enjoys ownership of a

river without water, but the Utopians can also be proud of
their poet laureate whose name, Anemolius, means "windbag"
and who is credited with writing a 12-line verse stanza

that accompanies the first Latin editions of Utopia. While

examples of verse were composed by several of More's
colleagues to accompany various editions of Utopia, it is
suggested that More himself composed the stanza attributed

to Anemolius. This stanza is notable in that it
demonstrates another level on which More's subtle irony is

working. For in the final two lines of the last quatrain,
Anemolius writes: "Wherefore not Utopie, but rather rightly
/ My name is Eutopie: A place of felicity."3 More cleverly

plays on the aural pun of "utopia" by emphasizing its
association with "eutopia." Thus More's "no place" can also

be translated as "good" or "happy place" by the combination
of the Greek eu with topos. Indeed More likely intended his
coinage and use of ironic names to be an amusing feature of

Utopia. These names not only reveal the hoax of Hythloday's
"travel narrative," but they may also indicate that at the

same time More was formulating his model commonwealth, he

3 See Sacks, Utopia, 205-07 for examples of verse composed for
the early Latin editions of Utopia.
6

The depiction of Amaurote as a heavily fortified city is

markedly absurd and out of place when Hythloday has already
characterized Utopia as a land that is virtually
inaccessible to foreigners and experiences no internal
civil strife by virtue of its communalist social
philosophy. Furthermore, the Utopians are described as a

people who detest war, hold jewels and gold in great
disdain, and never bother to lock their doors so that

whosoever wishes to enter the home of another may do so
whenever they please.4 Why then should the city be equipped

with such impenetrable defenses? Such paradoxes are woven

into the discourse itself, and they are presented in a most
innocuous and unsuspected manner, yet when recognized, they
lead one to rightly question Hythloday's advocacy of

Utopian institutions and practices as examples of a literal

ideal.

Perhaps more problematic than the instances of ironic
paradox in Utopia are the implications that these various

incongruities are the result of Hythloday's unreliability.

In the case where a spokesperson is clearly unreliable, a

4 See Sacks, Utopia, 133-34 for discussion concerning the living
situation of the Utopians in Amaurote; and 149-53 for their
philosophy regarding wealth; and 177-86 for the discussion
concerning warfare.
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perceptive reader would likely respond by considering the
assertions made by that character with a justifiable degree
of doubt and skepticism. However, in the case of Utopia's
primary spokesperson, this approach is of no avail. In

Utopia, we are presented with a multivalent text that

contains a primary speaker who contradicts himself. And in
spite of the hidden meaning of Hythloday as a "speaker of
nonsense," we cannot simply disregard his statements
altogether, as it is his discourse that provides the

subject and content of Utopia. The problematic nature of
Hythloday's character makes the task of determining where

or with whom our opinions should be aligned exceedingly

difficult. Thus, throughout the debate in Book I and the
discourse in praise of Utopia in Book II, we are never

quite certain when.we will have to reconsider, disregard,
or reverse what Hythloday is saying; we are only left with
the sense that at some point we will have to.

An example of this level of ambiguity emerges through

the course of Hythloday's argument in Book I in favor of
withdrawal from civic duty. When "More" and Giles suggest

to Hythloday that he apply his vast learning and judicious
insight in the service of some king or prince in order to
benefit the public good, Hythloday objects claiming that no
9

sovereign would heed his honest and forthright council.

Interestingly, "More" agrees, answering that such brazen
directness would be completely ineffective at court, no
matter how rational the counsel offered may actually be.

Thus "More" advocates the application of a more decorous

civil philosophy in the advising of kings and princes as
opposed to the direct approach of Hythloday's academic

philosophy. He argues that a civil approach would not only

be more effective, but its use would bring about less
conflict and contention.*
5 Hythloday, commenting upon the

alleged inefficacy of his direct approach, counters with
obvious punning on the title of More's work: "That is what

I meant ... when I said philosophy had no place among kings"

(121)

(emphasis added).

Yet in Book II, in his description of Utopian society,
Hythloday appears to contradict some of the key assertions

he presented in the debate on counsel. As David Weil Baker
points out, Hythloday's argument against the subtle use of

civic philosophy conflicts with his later narrative in
Book II, which treats the subject of the Utopians' policy
of religious toleration.6 According to Baker, Hythloday's

5 See Sacks, Utopia, 120-23.
5 See Sacks, Utopia, 187-89.
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account of the punishment of an overzealous Utopian convert

to Christianity who begins fanatically to endorse Christian
principles "serves as something of a corrective" to

Hythloday's previous assertion that a frank and direct

approach is always appropriate as well as preferable (52).7
The contradiction is made obvious when it is considered

that Utopus, the original founder of the Utopian
commonwealth, declared the law of religious toleration
expressly for the purpose of maintaining the peace:

For this is one of the ancientest laws among

them, that no man shall be blamed for reasoning
in the maintenance of his own religion. For King

Utopus ... hearing that the inhabitants of the land
were before his coming thither at a continual
dissension and strife among themselves for their

religions ... made a decree that it should be
lawful for every man to favor and follow what

religion he would, and that he might do the best
he could to bring others to his opinion, so that
he did it peaceably, gently, quietly, and
7 Baker's example (see 51-53) is presented in association with
Raphael's reference to Christian homiletics; however, I find it
offers equally effective support for the perception of Raphael's
reliability and the degree of difficulty one encounters when
reading Utopia.
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soberly, without hasty and contentious rebuking
and inveighing against others.

(188)

Utopus' law, which Hythloday. here praises, is concerned

less with what the Utopians accept as their religious or

spiritual beliefs than it is with, preventing behavior that
could lead to rioting and civil discord. Thus Utopus

himself, like "More," prefers discretion as opposed to
outright declarations of personal conviction. These

instances where Hythloday's fervent praise of Utopian

institutions and practices in Book II seem to directly

challenge those statements he forcefully expresses during
the debate on counsel in Book I invariably lead one to

consider the question of his reliability; as a result, the
reader of Utopia is teased and bewildered as to More's

ultimate vision of an ideal commonwealth.
The problematic character of Hythloday and the ironic

discourse of Book II result in a veil of ambiguity that

effectively obscures Utopia's overall purpose as well as
any indication of More's own position with respect to the
issues presented within it. The reader's grasp of which
arguments are to be taken as authoritative is precarious.

The author's seeming ambivalence or "lack of voice" is

disconcerting because Utopia, although it is by definition
12

a work of fiction, still- presents itself as an extremely
personal work. For Utopia's narrator is the author's
namesake, and the other interlocutor besides Hythloday is

named after Peter Giles, More's friend and fellow humanist.
Furthermore, the geographical setting of the discourse

between the three interlocutors encourages us to view it as

a historical record as it is said to take place in Antwerp,
where More, in the summer of 1515, actually spent a great

deal of time with Giles and began work composing Utopia.
More also demonstrates his admiration for Cardinal John

Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor of
England, by including references to him in Hythloday's

recounting of his previous visit to England. More's

personal association with Cardinal Morton dated back to the

years between 1490-1492 when young More served as the
Archbishop's page. And it was Cardinal Morton who shortly
thereafter arranged for More to attend school at Oxford.

These personal references indicate the extent to which the
certain aspects of More's life are reflected in Utopia.
And yet the life of Sir Thomas More is one that

provides an abundance of fascinating material, the result

of which has been the numerous biographies and historical-

biographical writings that have emerged alongside the
13

multiple editions of his published works. J.H. Hexter

points out that many biographical accounts written after
More's death tend to focus on his later life. In these

accounts, More is commonly viewed primarily in terms of his

affiliation with the Catholic counter-reformation - as a

"martyr-hero" and candidate for canonization - a

perspective that emphasizes his efforts to counteract the
progress of the Protestant reformation, his falling out

with Henry VIII over England's br.eak with the Roman
Catholic Church, his imprisonment in the Tower of London,
and his subsequent execution in 1535. Hence, such

biographical accounts downplay More's humanist
affiliations, as well as his abiding friendship with
Desiderius Erasmus, Europe's leading humanist scholar. At

the time of Utopia's publication in 1516, More was nearly
40 years old, a family man, a successful lawyer, and an

Undersheriff of London. Hexter places the historical
significance on these years (1515-1516) leading up to and
immediately surrounding the writing of the text ("Milieu"

xxv-xxvi). These years would seemingly provide the context
for More's ideas as expressed in Utopia.

The course by which Utopia evolved from an amorphous
concept in the humanist-trained, civically-invested mind of
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Thomas More into one of the most significant works of the
Renaissance literary tradition was this:

in May of 1515,

More was appointed by Henry VIII to travel to Bruges as

part of a diplomatic council in order to renegotiate terms
of commercial interaction in the trade of wool between

England and the Netherlands. Having reached an impasse in
the trade negotiations, More traveled to Antwerp and spent

several weeks lodging with Peter Giles, a close friend of
Erasmus. It is widely held that More conceived the idea of

his island commonwealth here in the summer of 1515. It is
likely that the two intellectuals, More and Giles,

discussed a variety of matters relating to statecraft and
the order of commonwealths. According to Hexter, such

topics were "a staple item of speculation among scholars
and academics, having got off to a good start in the

literary world with Plato and Aristotle" ("Milieu" xxxi).
By the time More returned to England in the fall of 1515,
he had completed what is now known as Book II of Utopia.
Yet once in London, More would be faced with a
complicated decision, and it was then that he began work on

the dialogue of council that would later become Book I. For

in the early part of 1516, More was offered a position in
the king's service, which also included a salary and thus a
15

means to support his sizeable family. Though More was

already a successful lawyer and an Undersheriff of London,

the question of whether he should devote his life to the
service of King Henry VIII was especially•difficult for

him. As E.E. Reynolds explains:
Tin invitation to enter the King's service in
those times was only short of a command, though a.

refusal would not have led to consequences more

serious than the loss of the King's goodwill;
even that, however, was not to be lightly risked

by one with a strong sense of public duty.

(117)

If More decided to continue his independent law practice,
he would be able to preserve, to some extent, his position

as a humanist "man of letters." However, if he accepted the
position as royal councilor to Henry VIII, More would no

longer be able to write independently about any topic he
wished. Now he would have to carefully consider the

potential ramifications of any subject or idea he might

choose to explore in his scholarly or political writings
(Sacks 29). More's struggle to come to a decision regarding

the offer is supposedly reflected in the humanist debate
that takes place between Hythloday, "More," and Giles. His

treatment of Book I further demonstrates the extent to
16

which Utopia appears to-be a personal work fraught with his
own conflicted feelings about whether it is better to live

a life of private philosophical contemplation or one

dedicated to public service and political activity.

What was the intellectual movement called humanism
that was sweeping across Europe in the early Renaissance,

and to which More, Giles, and Erasmus, among others, were

connected? As Quentin Skinner explains, humanism came to

northern Europe, first to Paris, then to England, by way of

Italy: "The culture of the Renaissance was further
disseminated in England by a number of Italian scholars who
came to teach at Oxford and Cambridge in the later years of

the fifteenth century" (195). Having come from this

intellectual milieu, More and his colleagues were learned

men, having studied grammar, rhetoric, and history. They
were widely known as "men of letters," and the bond between
them is evidenced in their vast correspondence. Hexter

describes these "men of letters," commonly referred to as
humanists, as follows:

The indispensable marks of a man of letters in
More's day were wide familiarity with the

literature of Roman antiquity; increasingly, some
acquaintance with the literature of Greek
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antiquity in its original tongue; and, finally,

command of a Latin style modeled with more or
less precision on classical Roman prose.

("Milieu" lviii)
More's engagement with Aristotle and Plato, as well as the
coded Greek names in Utopia, clearly identify the work as a

product of this movement. Yet the humanists were not merely
exclusive intellectuals who thrived as a result of the
revived interest in classical literature and culture, they

were also profoundly concerned with political, educational,

and religious reform. And these interests resulted in books
and writings relevant to social and political theory,

educational curricula, religious discourse, and scriptural
translation and interpretation.

That More's Utopia is a product of this intellectual
tradition is relatively easy to establish. Its subject

matter and classical narrative structure are not the only

indications of the work's humanist origins. The nature of
its publication also reflected the spirit of the humanist

project, as evidenced by the considerable collaborative

effort put forth by those individuals who participated in

More's scholarly circle. As was customary of sixteenth-

century literature, More desired to have letters of
18

endorsement and support composed for the introduction of

his work. The efforts of More's colleagues, combined with
the technology of the printing press, added to the
popularity of More's work. In regard to the "first age of
the printed book," Skinner states: "No group was quicker to

perceive the vast potentialities of the new medium than the
humanists" (195). The early Latin editions of Utopia
underwent five printings in More's own lifetime.
Furthermore, the first editions were accompanied by
Erasmus' and Giles' marginal annotations as well as by

laudatory letters and verses contributed by various members

of More's close association of humanist colleagues. A
Holbein engraving of the map of the island of Utopia and

the Utopian alphabet were later added for the 1518 edition.
Hence, Utopia's printed manifestation bore all the

respectable marks of having been vetted by a group of

internationally renowned scholars and illustrated by the
king's painter.
Through this humanist "republic of letters" that
surrounded Utopia's early publication, its reputation as an

enigmatic text begins to emerge. For the response from
More's own contemporaries who had not been directly

involved in the format and printing of the final work was
19

ambivalent. They grappled with the question of whether
Utopia was intended to be taken seriously or should rather

be enjoyed primarily for its creativity and inventiveness.
According to John Guy, Jerome de Busleyden, a prominent
political official and councilor to Charles V, associated
Utopia with works of classical philosophy and perceived its

purpose to be similar to Plato's: "He interpreted Utopia as
a mimetic exercise in moral philosophy, designed to

reinforce Plato's Republic as a counterweight to Aristotle
and Cicero." On the other hand, Guillaume Bude, the French

humanist and councilor to Francis I, was "unsure whether
More was writing allegorically or literally. His

commendation finally interpreted Utopia as an exemplar of
evangelical Christian humanism closer to Erasmus' Praise of
Folly than Plato's Republic" (91). Thus even from the

beginning, More's work was multivalent. Though Utopia was
certainly innovative and fascinating, it was also utterly

mystifying.

Utopia's ambiguity has largely resulted in
interpretations that propose a false dichotomy.

Accordingly, traditional readings of More's work have

depended upon the privileging of its association with
political discourse while overlooking or ignoring
20

completely the presence of its satiric features and ironic

language. However, any effort to confine Utopia to a single
authoritative reading would not be faithful to the spirit

of More's text. Thus, in order to pursue a more thorough
and comprehensive investigation of More's work, in the

chapters to follow, I will examine how Utopia's irony,

complexity, and ambiguity deliberately problematize any

attempt at a literal or conventional reading of it. This
method will then provide a means to explore the possible

implications, strategies, and intentions of More's work
that have been previously limited as a result of those
perspectives that have opted to view Utopia primarily in

terms, of strict political theory.

By virtue of the humanist context of its production,
the echoes and traces of Plato can be readily discerned -

in its dialogic structure, in the presentation of its

subject, and in the character of the primary spokesperson
Hythloday. It is in acknowledgement of this clear
association of More's work with classical political

philosophy that I begin my investigation in Chapter Two by

considering the interpretation of the work as a model for

social reform - as a description of a theoretical ideal
society. Yet my aim will be to expose the limitations of
21

those interpretations that attempt to emphasize this aspect

of Utopia. Because literal readings are exceedingly

dependent upon the reader's perception of Hythloday and the

acceptance of his assertions in the debate on counsel in

Book I and his description of Utopia as "the best state of
the commonwealth" in Book II, I will particularly focus on the questions surrounding Hythloday's reliability. A closer
examination of the rhetorical strategies employed in Book I

enable a more complete and accurate assessment of ethos,
and accordingly, reveals that we cannot routinely conclude
that Hythloday is intended to be seen as the voice of the

valid position in the debate. By means of rhetorical

analysis, we discover that Hythloday's intolerant demeanor
and reductive argumentative techniques encourage our
scrutiny and uncertainty in regard to his character and his

assertions. Furthermore, "More's" eloquent rhetorical
method and gracious manner are seen to be in exact
opposition to Hythloday.

Our awareness of Hythloday as an unreliable

spokesperson is crucial as it prepares us to assess the

validity of his discourse in praise of Utopia in Book II.
A more thorough examination of Utopia's institutions and
practices reveals a variety of absurd and troubling
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elements that would appear to contradict the status of
Utopian society as "ideal," or the argument that More

intended Utopia to be interpreted as a literal model or
blueprint for social reform. Our understanding of the

problematic aspects of Hythloday's characterization
prevents us from becoming so blindly enamored, as he is,
with Utopian society. Consequently, literal readings of

Hythloday as a reliable narrator or as More's spokesperson
are insufficient and incomplete, and they overlook More's

use of irony, his familiarity with the conventions of
satire, and his ability and skill as a rhetorician.

The limitations posed by literal readings of Utopia

compel us to explore the motivations and implications
underlying More's use of ironic language. To this end,

Chapter Three will begin by considering the friendship
between More and the renowned humanist scholar Erasmus, as

their shared intellectual interests and mutual appreciation
for humor and wit are perceptibly reflected in their

respective works Utopia and Encomium Moriae. More and
Erasmus were fascinated by the works of the classical

satirist Lucian. They recognized Lucian's parodic

depictions of Hellenic society as a valuable means of
social criticism. More and Erasmus accordingly applied
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Lucianic techniques in their own early writings in order to
comment upon certain aspects of contemporary sixteenth-

century English society. Particularly for More, Lucian's

dialogues provided an effective model from which to
construct the character of Hythloday.
The examination of Hythloday as a satiric persona

offers a much more insightful understanding of his

characterological function than traditional interpretations

that view him as a reliable spokesperson. When considering
the possible target of More's satiric scrutiny, an analysis

of the debate in Book I reveals the similarities between
Hythloday's demeanor and argumentative style with those of
Lucian's cynic philosopher in his dialogue The Cynic.

Lucian used irony and humor to satirize the dialectical
method employed by contemporary idealistic philosophers. In

the same way, More constructs the character of Hythloday in

order to present a parodic depiction of the specious

rhetorical techniques employed by the scholastic
theologians and schoolmen in sixteenth-century England.
Furthermore, Utopia's association with satiric fiction

helps us to recognize the strategy underlying More's

construction of Utopian absurdities in Book II. Rather than
insisting that Utopia be interpreted as an ideal
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commonwealth, More uses the imaginary society as a subtle

means to ironically comment on the absurd features of

European society. At the same time, More's consistent
ambiguity requires readers of Utopia to be active
participants in the process of interpretation and to be

able not only to construe a sophisticated and elaborate

jest, but also to discern the more profound and significant

aspects of his ironic commentary.
While More was known for his wit and sense of humor
and for his dedication to public service, he was also

reserved about many of his individual beliefs. In so far as
Utopia reflects the circumstances of More's life during the
years of 1515-16, it has largely been considered to be a
profoundly personal work. Accordingly Chapter Four will
attempt to consider the greater implications of More's use

of ironic and ambiguous language in order to explore the
complex facets of the author and his work. Utopia provided

More with a means to explore some exceedingly complex and
intricate ideas. Particularly in Book I, More explores the
conflicts of interest that inevitably arise when one is

confronted with a decision that will significantly affect
one's public status. More also understood the constructed

nature of identity - an idea he presents in Utopia by way
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of his "metaphor of the stage." As a result -of his own

various public and social roles, More was aware of the
necessity of fashioning a private self. Thus More
demystifies the conventional scholastic perspective of

human behavior as based on a foundational system of ethics.
Instead, he reveals life to be a series of roles inhabited

by an individual for the purposes of accomplishing a
specific objective. In More's view, this conception of

human behavior underscored the importance of a practical
intellectual education based in rhetoric in order to
prepare oneself to cope with the challenging,
unpredictable, and problematic circumstances of life.

Finally, through the ironic depiction of Utopian

society, Utopia provided More with the opportunity to
explore the limitations of the idealistic intellectualism
that was typically exemplified by the scholastic

theologians. Yet, in addition, More's irony was also subtly
self-reflexive as it examined the idealistic objectives of

the immense humanist project. While humanism believed that
humans could aspire to attain happiness in life, it also

acknowledged that human kind was irremediably sinful and
incapable of perfection. However, More's exploration of the

limitations of human rationality acknowledged that reform
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could not take place if humans could not conceive of a
better society. Thus More's Utopia exemplifies the
humanists' investment in the process of education by

insisting that readers strive to contemplate the complex
and multivalent features of his work, thereby ensuring the

continued education and cultivation of.the mind.
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CHAPTER TWO
"ALL THINGS BEING THERE COMMON":

UTOPIA AS MODEL REPUBLIC

In The Republic (ca. 380 B.C.), Plato presents his
conception of the ideal city. This politeia, ruled by the

Guardian class of the Philosopher-King, possesses a socio
political structure that exemplifies Plato's philosophical
notions of Justice. Plato's later work,

The Laws, proposed

a practical system of laws for an imaginary colony to be
established on the isle of Crete. Subsequently, Plato's

most distinguished-student, Aristotle, composed Politics,
which considers the Greek polis, or "city-state," to be the

highest form of political association. These works were
among the first in a long line of treatises devoted to the
thought experiment of imagining the "best commonwealth"
that would emerge over the course of the next several

centuries. The ideas presented in these texts and in other

ancient works of literature, moral philosophy, and
political theory inspired the intellectual activity of the
Renaissance and provided the foundation for humanist

scholarship. Such works undoubtedly influenced Thomas More,
who received an education grounded in the studia
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humanitatis while attending Oxford from 1492 to 1494. The
issues and concerns relating to statecraft and the order of

the commonwealth were considered relevant topics for
discussion among scholars and intellectuals at the turn of

the 16th century just as they were for philosophers and
thinkers of Greek and Roman antiquity.

Utopia has traditionally been viewed as a project
similar in scope to the dialogue concerning Plato's ideal
city. These two societies not only share the practice of

holding all things in common, but they also share a

similarly structured moral philosophy. According to Book IV
of The Republic, the "just" individual aims to fulfill the
desires of the rational part of the soul, while resisting .

the desires of the spirited and appetitive parts. And the
harmonious socio-political organization of the "just" city

is achieved when.all individuals fulfill the appropriate
societal role fitted to them by nature. More's Utopian

system of order is likewise based on the natural primacy of

reason: "for they define virtue to be life ordered
according to nature ... and that he doth follow the course of

nature, which, in desiring and refusing things, is ruled by

reason" (156). Thus in both societies, the "just" or
virtuous life is presented as the most pleasant. Yet Utopia
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is not a simple restatement of the ideas set forth in The
Republic. The Utopian regime is an amalgamated product of

the socio-political organizations presented in The Republic

and The Laws. In this "ideal" commonwealth, More expands
the system of community of property, similar to Plato's
standard in The Republic, to include all citizens of Utopia

rather than restricting it exclusively to a "Guardian"

class. Likewise, he devises a structure of government based
upon a system of decrees, as proposed in The Laws, which is
carried out by an organization of assemblies and councils,
thereby eliminating the need for a class of Philosopher-

Kings (Sacks 10-11). The association of Utopia with these
texts is a fine way to pay tribute to Plato, but it has

also served as a seemingly effective way, if the majority

of previous scholarship is any indication, of providing the
context for our interpretation of the work.

The influence of the classical tradition

notwithstanding, the interpretation of Utopia as strict
political theory is further based on the humanists'

educational and social objectives. As Quentin Skinner

explains, the northern humanists "continued to accept the
well-established humanist belief that the links between

sound learning and sound government are extremely close"
30

(213). As a function of their perceived roles as educators
and political advisors, the humanists produced a variety of

handbooks devoted to the practice of counseling kings,

princes, and other government officials. They likewise
produced treatises devoted to educational reform and the
discussion of the proper training to be offered by the

studia humanitatis. These efforts were exerted with the

intent that those who received a humanist education would
be prepared to serve in a principal position of government.
More's consideration of the role of advisors in political

and governmental affairs was not only based upon the

general interest amongst humanists regarding this issue. It

was also, on a very personal level, a matter of great
consequence for More. For in Book I of Utopia, More
presents two sides of the debate on counsel: "More's"

argument in favor of political involvement, and Hythloday's
argument in favor of withdrawal from civic affairs.

Critics have commented on the inherent ambiguity of
More's text with regard to the inevitable question of which
of these two perspectives is intended to be understood as
the valid position. One conclusion offered by George Logan

concentrates on Giles' comparison of Hythloday to Plato.
This comparison associates Hythloday's ideals with those of
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moral philosophy, a branch, Logan states, "to which

political theory is traditionally attached" (34).

Indeed

Hythloday does invoke the name of the great philosopher

multiple times in the course of his argument. This, in
connection with the similarities between Utopia and the

elements characteristic of Plato's dialogues, leads Logan

to conclude: "In sum, Hythloday seems designed for the role
Plato's spokesmen play in these dialogues: that of
completely reliable commentator on comparative politics and
a highly authoritative political theorist" (35). To be

sure, if one considers in addition that the debate on

counsel is sparked by a compliment offered, during a moment

of seemingly genuine admiration, in acknowledgment of
Hythloday's wisdom and astute faculties of observation and

analysis of foreign governments, and if we recognize

further that Hythloday is allowed to dominate the dialogue
of Book I with his prolonged orations and that "More," by
comparison, is limited to relatively brief responses, then

it would appear that Hythloday's argument is intended to be

considered the most persuasive. However, there is
compelling evidence to suggest that we should refrain from

interpreting Hytholday's role so hastily and conclusively.
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Since Book I demonstrates an indebtedness to the
classical tradition, it would be worthwhile to consider the

debate on counsel from the perspective of rhetorical
theory. The debate falls within the purview of deliberative

rhetoric, which is concerned specifically with persuasion with moving the audience to action - by arguing the

advantages or disadvantages of a proposed course of action.
By examining the style of argumentation presented by "More"
and Hythloday, we are able to sea how their means of

persuasion reveals a more accurate delineation of character
(or ethos) in spite of Hythloday's ability to maintain the
upper hand throughout the dialogue. While Hythloday's

association with Plato confers on him a degree of

historical and intellectual authority, it should be
remembered that "More" and Hythloday are relative equals,

unlike the naive, participants of typical Platonic dialogues

who innocently set up the dialectical situation for

Socrates to take advantage of. This underscores the

necessity of evaluating the dialogue carefully,

concentrating not only on the issue under debate, but also
on how each character presents his position and what
evidence each offers in support.
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Hythloday establishes his stance by arguing that kings

are only interested in matters of war and in enlarging

their own wealth and territory. Furthermore, rulers
surround themselves with counselors who aim to flatter and

who believe their own counsel to be the only advice worth
consideration; therefore they would scorn the proposals

offered by another that are not in complete accord with

their own.1 Hythloday concludes that if he were to serve as

a counselor, he would not only be ineffectual, but he would
also eventually lose his position as a result of his

unconventional advice:
If I should propose to any king wholesome
decrees, doing my endeavor to pluck out of his
mind the pernicious original causes of vice and

naughtiness, think you not that I should

forthwith either be driven away or else made a
laughingstock? (114)
As proof for these assertions, Hythloday offers two
hypothetical scenarios: the first centers on a French king

interested in conquering various lands throughout Europe,
the second involves "some king and his council" devising

ways to increase the king's treasury. With regard to the
1 See Sacks, Utopia, 96.
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first scenario, Hythloday states that his advice to the

king would be to concentrate his efforts on the enrichment

of his own kingdom, since one realm is more than enough for

a single sovereign to govern.2 With regard to the second,
Hythloday's counsel would be to remind the king that,
similar to the task of a shepherd, it is his station to

ensure the wealth and happiness of his people over his own.
In closing, Hythloday directs the question to "More" with
the assumption that these hypothetical situations are
adequate support for his argument that he would inevitably

fail as a political adviser: "These, and such other

informations, if I should use among men wholly inclined and
given to the contrary part, how deaf hearers think you I
should have?" (120-21).

It is obvious why Hythloday would need to rely on the
supposed or likely outcome of these invented scenarios for
support; in spite of all he has observed while abroad and

his understanding of European domestic and foreign policy,
he has apparently had little practical experience in civic

affairs. Moreover, Hythloday's argument is based on broad
generalizations informed by an overly reductive view of

royal persons and government officials. Certainly, corrupt
2 See Sacks, Utopia, 117-19.
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sovereigns and sycophantic counselors do exist; no one
disputes Hythloday on this point. However, it would seem

that the monarchs and advisors Hythloday has had experience

with would lead him to an alternate conclusion regarding
the potential for advisors to not only offer sincere

counsel, but to do so in the service of thoughtful and
honest kings. In his hypothetical .scenarios, Hythloday

refers to his knowledge of the Achorians (Greek for "people
without a country") who, after going to war for their

prince and then witnessing the distress this action caused,
demanded of their prince to chose one kingdom and
relinquish the other. According to Hythloday, the Achorian

prince conceded to the demands of his subjects. Hythloday
also mentions his observation of the Macarians ("the

blessed ones") whose king, on the day of his coronation,

declared the hoarding of money and property by a ruler to
be illegal. However, insofar as these honorable peoples are
entirely unknown to Giles and "More," perhaps Hythloday

intends to isolate corruption as a trait specific to
European rulers and counselors. The fault with this
conclusion becomes evident when we consider that Hythloday

was previously in Europe for a time prior to his meeting
with "More" and Giles. In recounting this prior visit,
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Hythloday reveals his experience with political and social

affairs to be not limited to distant nations. While in

England, Hythloday had the opportunity to converse with
Cardinal John Morton, who, as he specifically notes, was

serving in the position of Lord Chancellor of England at
the time of their meeting. Hythloday describes Morton as a

man:

... not more honorable for his authority than for

his prudence and virtue ... In his speech he was

fine, eloquent, and pithy; in the law he had
profound knowledge; in wit he was incomparable,
and in memory wonderful excellent. These

qualities, which in him were by nature singular,
he by learning and use had made perfect. The king

put much trust in his counsel ... (97)
Hythloday's praise of Cardinal Morton and his description

of the Cardinal's conduct would seem to contradict the
obvious disdain he exhibits toward those active in
political affairs. The Cardinal agrees with Hythloday's

assessment given during his critique of European society
regarding the harsh punishment of thieves, and the Cardinal

is eager to hear him discuss his observations further
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(105) .3 The fact that his experience with Morton does not

give Hythloday pause to consider a more nuanced assessment

of counsellorship is a feature that serves to undermine his

reliability as well as the validity of his argument.
The logic underlying Hythloday's position on counsel
reflects a scholastic worldview. It is a methodical

perspective primarily interested in classical philosophy,
ethics, and Christian theology.

As with any earthly

institution, in politics and government one will inevitably

encounter corruption. However, Hythloday cannot tolerate
any course of action that does not unequivocally exemplify

his orthodox conception of right and wrong behavior. Aware
that few rulers or counselors would respond favorably to

his principled moral philosophy, Hythloday concludes that
any attempt made by a wise person to advise a king or

prince would be a futilely wasted effort. And "More"
agrees. To Hythloday's question of whether his counsel

would fall on "deaf hearers," "More" responds:
Deaf hearers doubtless, and in good faith no

marvel. And to be plain with you, truly, I cannot

3 During this discussion with Morton, Hythloday refers to the
penal practices of the Polylerites ("much nonsense"), which
serves as yet another example of More's coinage of ironical Greek
names for various imaginary peoples and places.
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allow that such communication shall be used, or
such counsel given, as you be sure shall never be

regarded nor received. For how can so strange

informations be profitable, or how can they be
beaten into their heads, whose minds be already
prevented with clean contrary persuasions? This
school philosophy is not unpleasant among friends
in familiar communication, but in the councils of

kings where great matters be debated and reasoned
with great authority, these things have no place.

(121)
"More" points out that Hythloday's scholastic philosophy,

which "thinketh all things meet for every place," results

in counsel that lacks expediency and is therefore

ineffectual; Hythloday's recommendations and manner of
delivery are not suited to obtain potential short-term

advantages (121). Furthermore, it is useless to offer
advice in such a fashion as to render it objectionable.
Additionally, "More" brings to light a fundamental fact of

human existence, namely that the course of action
considered the most "moral" or "ethical," as Hythloday

would define it, does not always coincide with the
appropriate means of resolving the immediate issue at hand.
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This leads "More" to propose, by way of his metaphor of the

stage, the use of a practical civic philosophy advocated by

contemporary humanists when dealing with matters of

government:
But there is another philosophy more civil which

knoweth, as you would say, her own stage, and
thereafter ordering and behaving herself in the

play that she hath in hand, playeth her part
accordingly with comeliness, uttering nothing out

of due order and fashion. And this is the

philosophy you must use.

(121)

"More's" metaphor of the stage envisions counselors playing
a significant role within the dramatic setting of politics.

"More's" practical approach reflects the Ciceronian, hence
the humanist, principle of counsel embodying both wisdom

and eloquence. In particular, "More" suggests the principle
of decorum and insists that the manner and use of speech be
suited to its occasion. In regard to matters of government,

guidance must exercise prudence, be offered delicately, and
aspire to expediency rather than disintegrate into pedantic
sermonizing. In addition, "More" argues that the potential
for dishonesty and corruption is no excuse to abandon the

commonwealth. Rather, wise men should be involved in

40

political affairs in order to offer constructive counsel

and effect as much positive change as possible:

But you must with a crafty wile and subtle train
study and endeavor yourself, as much as in you
lieth, to handle the matter wittily and

handsomely for the purpose, and that which you
cannot turn to good so to order it that it be not
very bad, for it is not possible for all things

to be well unless all men were good, which I

think will not be yet these good many years.

(122)
Thus, "More" suggests a method that is effective,

practical, and mindful of the difficulties that arise on
account of human fallibility. "More" proposes offering

counsel that is appropriate and eloquently presented as a

means to overcome these obstacles.

"More's" response to Hythloday's long-winded oration
reveals much about his character. He presents his argument

concisely, tactfully, and in a manner that exemplifies his
approach to counsel; his is an eloquent expression that

aims to graciously instruct, clearly convey thought, as
well as to establish and maintain goodwill amongst the
participants in the debate (Wegemer 290). In contrast,
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Hythloday's argument deteriorates into spiteful ranting

that includes generalizations, hyperbole, a priori
assumptions, and ad hominem attacks (Wegemer 293).

Hythloday dismisses "More's" suggestion and bitterly
exclaims: "By this means, nothing else will be brought to

pass, but whiles I go about to remedy the madness of

others, I should be even as mad as they" (122). Hythloday's
lack of compelling proof and practical experience leads him

to offer arguments a priori by appealing to assumed
universal principles. Specifically, he invokes Christ and

his insistence that his commandments be preached from the

rooftops, and Plato's declaration that wise men, seeing it
impossible to "remedy the folly of others," refrain from
participating in the affairs of the commonwealth (122-23).

After declaring all counselors to be corrupt and deceitful
madmen, Hythloday focuses his attack on "More" by comparing

him and such counselors that would apply his civic
philosophy to duplicitous preachers:
But preachers, sly and wily men, following your

counsel (as I suppose) because they saw men evil
willing to frame their manners to Christ's rule,
they have wrested and wried his doctrine, and,

like a rule of lead, have applied it to men's
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manners that by some means at the least way, they
might agree together. Whereby I cannot see what

good they have done, but that men may more
sickerly [chiefly] be evil.

(123)

Although Hythloday is characteristically associated with

Plato, his emotionally vehement manner of argumentation is

a far cry from the Socratic dialectical method that aims to
impart knowledge and achieve consensus. Instead,

Hythloday's argument relies on harsh statements and self-

evident propositions asserted without thorough examination

or analysis. The debate on counsel reveals Hythloday to be

a character whose discourse does less to persuade and
elucidate than it does to provoke confusion and skepticism.
The question surrounding Hythloday's reliability suggests
we would be remiss to read Utopia as a strict endorsement

of his views as opposed to "More's."
The dialogue of Book I not only presents the debate on
counsel, but it also enables Hythloday the opportunity, in
his account of dinner at Cardinal Morton's table, to offer
a severe critique of English society. A discussion

concerning the suitability and efficacy of punishment for
those guilty of stealing leads to the examination of

several factors that contribute to England's extensive
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social problems. Hythloday argues that starvation drives

people to steal regardless of the punishment that might be
suffered if one is caught. He then concludes that private
property is the underlying cause for all civil discord:

"where possessions be private, where money beareth all the
stroke, it is hard and almost impossible that there the
public weal may justly be governed and prosperously

flourish" (123-24). In accordance with the contrastive

rhetoric presented in regard to the issue of counsel,
"More," relying on Aristotle's line of reasoning in
Politics, respectfully disagrees:
For how can there be abundance of goods, or of

anything, where every man withdraweth his hand

from labor? Whom the regard of his own gains
driveth not to work, but the hope that he hath in
other men's travails maketh him slothful.

(125)

In response, Hythloday delivers his description of Utopia,
where the socio-economic structure is such that "with very

few laws all things be so well and wealthily ordered"
(124). Utopia is thus presented in Book II as a universal

example of a thriving commonwealth built upon the principle

of the community of property.
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That the critique of European society provokes

Hythloday's account of the Utopians has further led critics

to determine the meaning or intent of More's text to follow
properly along the lines of serious socio-political theory.

For instance, Logan interprets More's description of the

Utopian commonwealth as an exercise in comparative
political analysis by providing a theoretical solution to
the social problems discussed in Book I:

Unlike the Republic, which presents its

conclusions simply in the form of argument,
Utopia offers an actual model, so that it tests

results - provides an opportunity to glimpse how
they might work out in practice - even as it

states them.

(130)

And J.H. Hexter claims that More's inventiveness is not so
much demonstrated by his concept of a nation that holds all

property in common, but rather it is found in the:
... meticulous detail with which [More] implemented
his underlying social conceptions, proposing all
the basic rules of law and methods of
administration necessary to make community of

property and goods one of the motor forces in a

going polity.

(Idea 63)
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These perspectives of Utopia, as a kind of solution to

England's social problems, a theoretical strategy for
reform, or as More's conceptual model of the ideal

commonwealth, are based on a literal interpretation of
More's language. However, by problematizing the character

of Hythloday, More deliberately frustrates the inclination

to interpret Utopia literally. Hythloday's fanatical and

intolerant behavior during the course of the dialogue in
Book I intentionally influences how we will construe his
discourse in praise of the Utopians in Book II.

The policies and practices of the Utopians are founded
upon the principles of rationality, expediency, and selfsufficiency, thus the island of Utopia ostensibly

epitomizes the Greek conception of the model republic.
According to Hythloday, a system designed around the

precept of community of property ensures equality and
reciprocity among the members of the commonwealth since
one's effort is expended to ensure the success and well

being of the state rather than to aid her/his own
accumulation of wealth. Accordingly, the Utopians have
effectively eliminated idleness by systematizing labor

practices such that all citizens are brought up with the
expectation that they will work in agriculture; and in
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addition to farming, they are also trained in a particular

trade such as wool working, carpentry, or masonry? In order
to ensure that citizens do not become unfairly relegated to
the strenuous labor demanded by farming, and thus resentful
of completing such work against their will, every two
years, half of every rural household is rotated out of the •

country and sent to the city. The same number is then sent
from the city to take their places as farm workers.4
5 The

Utopian system is also evidently superior because it
restricts any potential inclination toward greed and self-

indulgence since no one is in want of anything he/she needs
and nothing is given in exchange for anything else. As

Hythloday states:

Certainly in all kinds of living creatures either
fear of lack doth cause covetousness and ravin,
or in man only pride, which counteth it a

glorious thing to pass and excel others in the

superfluous and vain ostentation of things.

(143)

This kind of prideful display is without cause in a system
where everyone takes only what is needed, knowing that

there will never be any shortage of essential goods.

4 See Sacks, Utopia, 136.
5 See Sacks, Utopia, 130.
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Furthermore, although the Utopians only devote six
hours a day to work, any and all opportunities for
licentious or depraved behavior are prevented as all "void

time" (time between the hours of work, sleep, and eating)

is rigorously structured around learning:
... every man as liketh best himself, not to the

intent that they should misspend this time in
riot or slothfulness, but, being then licensed
from the labor of their own occupations, to
bestow the time well and thriftily upon some
other science as shall please them.

(137)

Upon waking at roughly four o'clock in the morning,
citizens can choose to attend any number of public lectures

or devote their spare time to his/her trade. After supper,
Utopians can amuse themselves with conversation, music, or
with playing "moral" games that serve to reinforce good

manners and virtuous principles.6

And yet in spite of the blind conviction with which he

praises their institutions, Hythlodays's description of
Utopian social practices fails to effectively prove the

Utopian system to be superior to or more desirable than any
European system. Hythloday's commentary indeed portrays a
6 See Sacks, Utopia, 146.
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country that appears to have fewer problems thanks to a
social order based on community of property. However,

contrary to his assertion that the Utopians are a "people
well ordered" requiring very few laws, Hythloday reveals
the Utopians to be a people who are completely regimented

by innumerable laws, decrees, and deeply entrenched social

customs. For example, in addition to their organized labor
practices and strict structuring of "free time," male

children must train in the trade of their fathers. If they
desire to learn a different trade, they are placed by

adoption into a family of that occupation. City inhabitants

must move and be reassigned to new houses every ten years.
To maintain the size of all cities, it is decreed that each
city will be limited to six thousand households. If there

are too many households within a city, the excess number is
transferred to another city. Similarly, if the number of

adults within a household exceeds the maximum amount

allotted, the excess number of adults is transferred to

another household that is lacking in number. If the
population of the entire island exceeds the designated

quota, citizens from every city are removed and transported
off the island to a colony on the mainland; and if the
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population of the island should decrease sharply, citizens

are brought back from the colonies to restore the numbers.7

According to Hythloday, the travel of citizens within
Utopia is also restricted and requires permission. Anyone

who participates in the simple act of traveling to a

neighboring city to visit friends, or to partake in a
little sightseeing, must do so following the proper
protocol, or else risk severe punishment:

If any man, of his own head and without leave,
walk out of his precinct and bounds, taken

without the prince's letters, he is brought back
again for a fugitive or a runaway with great

shame and rebuke and is sharply punished. If he
be taken in that fault again, he is punished with

bondage. . (147) .

While Hythloday repeatedly proclaims the "wealth and

felicity of the Utopian commonwealth," one cannot help but
wonder how any human being could live "joyfully" and
"merrily" in a society that is so restrictive of the

seemingly free choice to decide what trade one wants to

pursue and where one can live and travel within their own
country (198, 200). We might be further compelled to ask
7 See Sacks, Utopia, 142.
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how the Utopians are able to willingly adhere to such a

strictly controlled social system.

According to Hexter, Utopia is the "best of
commonwealths," not necessarily because the Utopians are of

a better nature or character than persons found in any

other society, but because their "laws, ordinances,

rearing, and rules of living are such as to make effective
man's natural capacity for good, while suppressing his

natural propensity for evil" (Idea 59)." Indeed, as

Hythloday implies, the Utopians are not a faultless people,
as can be seen by the penalties one might incur if any

established law or decree should be trespassed against.
However, the effective suppression of any instinctive human

tendency toward self-centered preservation and accumulation

is the product of the Utopians' strict adherence to a
complex pattern of guiding cultural principles that are

internalized by each citizen during various educational and
socialization processes. The Utopian moral philosophy

upholds human happiness as its primary concern, and
happiness is derived by living a life devoted to pleasure.

Yet the Utopian view of "pleasure" consists of a
subscription to an Epicurean ethic that promotes

intellectual reason, rather than transient physical
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pleasures, as the highest form of virtue. According to
Hythloday, the belief that happiness and contentment derive

from seeking honest pleasure finds support in Utopian
religious principles: "the defense of this so dainty and

delicate an opinion, they fetch from their grave, sharp,
bitter, and rigorous religion."8 However, in Utopia,

philosophic rationalism must be exercised in conjunction
with their religious principles as it is reason that leads

men to accept and believe them: "Though these be pertaining
to religion, yet they should be believed and granted by
proofs of reason" (155-56). Thus religious tenets are

determined by way of reason rather than, as would be the

case of Christian doctrine, revelation.
It is this elaborately constructed system of belief,
which Hythloday recounts to "More" and Giles with such

fervor, that enables the "success" of the Utopian
commonwealth. The Utopians seek human happiness above all
else; and happiness is the result of pleasure, which is
deemed virtuous when it adheres to their religious

doctrine. And these tenets are the product of reason rather
8 Raphael explains Utopian religious principles to be: "that the
soul is immortal and by the bountiful goodness of God, ordained
to felicity; that to our virtues and good deeds rewards be
appointed after this life and to our evil deeds punishments"
(155) .
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than revelation. Furthermore, the "virtuous" life is one

that is lived according to nature: "Therefore, even very

nature (say they) prescribeth to us a joyful life ... and
they define virtue to be life ordered according to the

prescript of nature" (157). What the Utopians have
effectively accomplished, and what serves as the means by
which Utopia appears to be superior to European society, is

the invention of a moral philosophy that aids in the
complete subjugation of the individual will in order to

benefit the concept of the "common good" by shrewdly
declaring such an endeavor to be rational, virtuous, and

natural:
But in that that nature doth allure and provoke

men one to help another to live merrily (which
surely she doth not without a good cause, for no

man is. so far above the lot of man's state or

condition that nature doth cark and care for him

only, which equally favoreth all that be
comprehended under the communion of one shape,
form, and fashion) , verily, she commandeth thee

to use diligent circumspection that thou do not

seek for thine own commodities, that thou procure
other's incommodities.
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(157)

(emphasis added)

The Utopian moral philosophy attempts to naturalize certain
human behaviors and actions that do not, in fact, come

naturally, as the examination of numerous earthly societies
would demonstrate, by declaring virtue and pleasure to be

the natural products of philosophic rationalism.

What

Hythloday'.s discussion of Utopian philosophy reveals,
perhaps inadvertently, is that if Utopia is to be
considered a model republic, then the simple dissolution of

private property is not the only action necessary to solve
England's problems as discussed in Book I. Such a project
would also apparently require the implementation of an
immutable social order radically different from any

currently known in Europe. It is not only necessary to

prohibit private property, but to also strip citizens of

any right to self-determination and to inhibit any inherent
inclination to work earnestly for one's own gain.

Thus Utopia presents a number of perplexing issues
that must be dealt with (or ignored) if one is to insist on
viewing More's text strictly in terms of philosophy or
political theory. In addition to the question of
Hythloday's reliability, there is the presence of various
absurd and ironic names, which seem to allude to More's
sharp sense of humor. However, Logan's reaction to such
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instances of irony is to warn readers against making the

"fatal error" of mistaking Utopia as nothing more than a

"whimsical potpourri" and of assuming "that More's joking

names signal his disapproval of the ideas associated with
them" (71n, 137n). When trying to account for more

problematic inconsistencies, such as emerge when Hythloday
declares his disdain for counselors or political advisors,

which would seem to contradict his esteem for Cardinal

Morton, Logan demurely suggests: "One may, however, feel
that it is likelier that More, trying to do too much at
once, simply lost track of one of the implications of the

passage" (47).

We must also consider the interpretation of More's
text as the depiction of an ideal republic that presents a
theoretical, though clearly impractical, solution to the

problems evident in European society. Edward Surtz attempts

to account for this impracticality by determining
Hythloday's discussion of Utopia's community of property to

be the accurate reflection of an ideal that is harmonious
with More's Christian orthodoxy: "Hythloday represents
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More's ideal views. //9 At the same time, Surtz claims that
the argument presented by "More" in Book I in favor of

private property is indicative of More's view as a sensible
statesman who is aware of mankind's inability to live in a
Christian state where all property is held in common: "In a
word, if he regards communism abstractly or academically,
More favors communism. If he looks at what is in man, he

defends private property" (182) .
And finally we must deal with the dubious description
of the Utopians as a "joyful" or "merry" people and with

the tensions that arise when one ponders the implications
of the Utopian social order. Hanan Yoran accurately
identifies the self-contradictory nature of an order that

proclaims a "general commitment to democracy and liberty"
which is then undermined by a "reality severely restrictive
of political participation and free human activity" (10).

Thus, Yoran concludes that Utopia "fails to elaborate a

coherent ethics and consequently fails to ground the
Utopian social order." As Yoran argues, Utopian moral
philosophy likewise proves to be self-contradictory in its

declaration that reason "leads to both a naturalistic
9 Surtz's conclusion that Hythloday presents More's ideal views
must of course overlook the question regarding Raphael's
reliability as a spokesperson.
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ethics and its ultimate transcendence" (14). In other
words, Utopian philosophy claims that reason and virtue are

natural human inclinations while at the same time it
demands that citizens repress and overcome their natural

(innate) tendencies toward self-interest.
And yet to assume that the presence of irony,
contradiction, and absurdity within the text is the result
of some shortcoming or oversight on More's part would be to

ignore a salient feature of his text. In that More

intentionally coined various ironic Greek terms for his
work, it seems negligent to disregard the possible
implications of these amusing terms for our interpretation
of the text. Furthermore, while the process of inventing an

imaginary commonwealth may enable one to present a
conceptual model of an ideal society in order to speculate

how a society designed as such might conceivably function,

the social problems described in Book I were very real
concerns for More, and a description of an ideal

commonwealth based on the principle of community of

property would not offer a practical solution. In fact,

Hythloday's discourse in praise of Utopia exemplifies his
own ineffectual approach to counsel. He argues in favor of

a radical course of action that would not only be
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exceedingly difficult to implement, but would also do
nothing to resolve the immediate problems that he discusses

in Book I. To presume that Hythloday presents More's view
of an ideal, then, is to limit the relevance and
significance of his work in regard to the definite problems
evident in sixteenth-century English society. And while the

observation that the Utopian social order fails on account
of the fact that "More does not introduce any principle
external to its fundamental assumptions concerning reality"

is very perceptive, it is based on a pre-established
assessment that Utopia is intended to be read literally as
political theory and accordingly fails to offer a useful

theoretical model of a flawless social order (Yoran 14).
However, it should be noted that the inability of the

Utopian society to be grounded in any principle or view of
reality outside of itself is not only the failure of the
Utopians, but of any several social orders founded upon

such metaphysical concepts as "reason," "freedom," or

"democracy."
In fact, any resolution to view Utopia as the
description of a model commonwealth means that there is no

choice but to attribute these problematic elements to
failure or oversight. Yet in doing so, the text is
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effectively closed off, and there appears to be no need to
give any further consideration to obvious instances of
irony or contradiction. However, More's Oxford education,

his reputation as a scholar, as well as his professional
achievements as a successful lawyer and politician, would

seem to suggest that he had an exceptional knowledge of
language, and was accordingly able to use discourse

artfully and successfully over the course of his political
and literary career. According to Arthur F. Kinney, such an

expert understanding of language was characteristic of the
humanist writers, whose intellectual training was founded

upon the classical trivium: the study of grammar, logic,
and rhetoric. With respect to this humanist tradition, from

which More, his colleagues, and Utopia emerged, Kinney
states that More can plausibly "engage in wordplay" because
he can rely on readers who "understand that although words

are a necessary means to knowledge, they are also always
multiple in their referents and at best approximate

meanings in their capacity to convey thought" (56).

The implication then is that rather than overlooking
occurrences of humor, inconsistency, and contradiction, we
might consider them as a means of opening the text for

further exploration. Accordingly, a more thorough
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investigation of More's work needs to consider how and why
Utopia's irony, complexity, and ambiguity serve to

deliberately problematize any attempt at a conventional

reading of it. Thus More intentionally compels and, in
fact, requires readers to become skeptical interpreters.
Literal interpretations of Utopia purely as a theoretical
model for social reform or as a description of More's ideal

society are both insufficient and incomplete. Likewise, a
reader's interpretive choice made without acknowledging
More's use of irony and without attempting to resolve the

instances of paradox or contradiction makes for a

simplistic and reductive reading. Thus, it is worthwhile to
investigate the deeper levels of meaning underlying the

elaborate discourse of Utopia.

60

CHAPTER THREE
"TO RESEMBLE AND COUNTERFEIT THE FOOL":

DISCOVERING UTOPIA'S IRONIC SUBTEXT

In the summer of 1499, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam
made his first trip to England at the invitation of his

former pupil William Blount, Lord Mountjoy. While there, he

was introduced to Thomas More, who was almost ten years

younger than the Dutch scholar, and at that time, in the
midst of completing his training as a barrister at

Lincoln's Inn. The encounter between the two men led to an
enduring friendship founded upon their mutual enthusiasm
for scholarship and intellectual activity as well as their

shared appreciation for spirited wittiness and humor.
Later, in 1509, when Erasmus returned to London from his
travels abroad, he lodged at the home of his dear companion
Thomas More. During his stay, Erasmus, spurred by More's
fervent encouragement, completed a modest work in the span

of a few days wherein he displayed his clever sense of
humor through a skillful application of wit and irony.

Erasmus dedicated his work, a mock encomium titled In

Praise of Folly, to his good friend More and was, in fact,
delighted with the verbal pun More's named presented in the
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Latin translation of the title: Encomium Moriae - "In

Praise of More." The work was finally revised and published

in Paris in 1511. In the prefatory letter, which he
addressed to More, Erasmus discusses the origin of his idea

to compose a work in praise of folly:
My first hint came from your family name of More,
which is just as close to Moria, the Greek word

for folly, as you are remote from the thing

itself. In fact, everyone agrees that you are as
far removed from it as possible. Besides, I had a

suspicion that this joke would be agreeable to

you because you particularly enjoy jests of this
sort - that is, if I don't flatter myself, jests

seasoned with a touch of learning and a dash of

wit.

(3)

Erasmus alludes to More's sophisticated sense of humor and
lively appreciation for clever jokes and jests. In his

closing remarks, Erasmus charges More to "defend [his]

Folly faithfully" (5).
And defend it he did. Erasmus' Moriae was a humorous,

yet incisively satiric, examination of the excessive folly

exhibited by contemporary pedantic theologians and

schoolmen and corrupt rulers, courtiers, and members of the
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clergy. The implicit social commentary, delivered through

Folly's oration, did not escape the attention of the
doctrinaire scholasticists. In 1514, when it became
abundantly clear that more editions of the work would be

forthcoming, Erasmus' adversaries deemed it necessary to

issue a confutation of the accusations put forth in the

Moriae. For the task, the offended parties chose Martin Van

Dorp, an aspiring theologian and former acquaintance of
Erasmus. Van Dorp promptly issued the first of two letters

publicly discrediting Erasmus and the charges presented by

Folly. In response, Erasmus composed his Defense of Folly.

In 1515, when Van Dorp issued his second letter attacking
Erasmus, More became involved in the "humanist-scholastic"

debate and accordingly composed his own extensive letter to
Van Dorp in defense of the Moriae (Satire 31).

More's involvement in the controversy surrounding the
reception of Erasmus' Moriae, as Warren W. Wooden points

out, is significant as it testifies to their mutual concern
over the detrimental effects of medieval theological dogma
and scholastic intellectualism (32). Additionally, More's
defense of Erasmus speaks to their shared appreciation for

the ability of humorously satiric discourse to effectively
comment upon instances of pride, hypocrisy, excess, and
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corruption evident in society. Furthermore, this time

period, from 1515 to 1516, is noteworthy in relation to
More's own literary productivity as it was during this

period that he, while embroiled in the humanist-scholastic

controversy and writing his letter to Martin Van Dorp, was
also at work composing his Utopia. And yet, More's and

Erasmus' familiarity with the function of satiric irony, as

a means to critique social institutions and comment upon
the established cultural practices in which they themselves
were immersed and invested, began to develop before the

emergence of Encomium Moriae. In 1505, Erasmus, in his
efforts to expand his knowledge of the Greek language,

developed an interest in the works of Lucian. He and More,
who shared Erasmus' appreciation of the classical satirist,

began translating the dialogues of Lucian from Greek into
Latin. The Latin versions of Lucian's works were completed
and published in the winter of 1506. Lucian's skillful

execution of satire and his sharp wit, elegant style, and
great capacity for invention and creativity would serve to
influence the works of both Erasmus and More. As E.E.
Reynolds writes:

So Erasmus could see in the contemporary world
material for the pen of a Lucian, and his own
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genius could supply the wit and satire. More had

the same turn of mind and the two friends could

enjoy Lucian and then apply the same method of
criticism to the abuses they saw around them.
(54)

Even as Encomium Moriae and Utopia reveal their foundations
to be fixed in the classical rhetorical tradition, these

works also exhibit characteristics of irony and satire that
are of a distinctly Lucianic nature. Like Lucian, More and

Erasmus found the dogmatic and moralistic idealists of
their day to be prime targets for satiric examination.
I
Lucian of Samosata was born in Syria, in roughly

125 A.D., near the Euphrates and lived during the "age of
rhetoricians" (Works viii). He eventually traveled to

Ionia, where the cities of Smyrna and Ephesus were brimming

with sophists and teachers of rhetoric. It was a time in

the classical age when skilled sophists and famous rhetors

traveled to various cities and exhibited their skills by

appearing in the public forum and delivering an oration ex
tempore about any subject proposed by the audience. Lucian

would similarly earn his living by showcasing his abilities
in rhetoric and public oration while in Ionia, Greece,

Italy, and Gaul. Yet in approximately 163-4 A.D., after he
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settled in Athens, Lucian's career as a rhetor came to an

end as he determined that this particular style of

discourse was more appropriate for those in the legal

profession who vigorously sought to achieve success rather
than to discover truths. For the .sophists and rhetoricians,

victory was achieved by the obfuscation of issues and the
application of specious appeals. Lucian's interests

eventually turned to philosophy, particularly the Socratic
method practiced by Plato; he determined the Socratic

procedure, or dialectic, to be the means to elicit truths
(Works xi). Between 165 to 175 A.D., Lucian's most prolific
period, he would appropriate this method in his own series

of dialogues. Using humor and irony, Lucian offers a
parodic portrayal of philosophical dialectic to interrogate

the seeming validity of the disingenuous and hypocritical

philosophical schools of thought commonly favored by the
educated. In his application of the Socratic dialogue form

to parodic and satiric purpose, then, Lucian provides one

precursor to the method we seem to observe in the dialogue
in Book I of More's Utopia.

Lucian's satiric style and inquisitive nature would
eventually earn him the reputation as a "scoffer"

(Works xxv). "Lucianism," as R. Bracht Branham explains,
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became "synonymous with a particularly virulent form of
disbelief, associated not merely with an absence of faith,

but with a kind of skepticism informed by ridicule for the

credulity of the faithful" (24). It was this tradition of
prose satire, also referred to as Menippean satire, which

Erasmus and More, along with earlier Italian humanists who
were fascinated with Lucian, helped revive during the
European Renaissance. Their translations of Lucian's

dialogues underwent multiple printings and were widely
read. As a result, his works were "among the first Greek
texts to excite aspiring Hellenists of the early
Renaissance"

(Bedlam 19).

Lucian wrote in the tradition of Menippean satire. The
term "Menippean" finds its origin in Greek literature;
specifically, it derives from those works, now lost,
written by the Greek Cynic Menippus. According to Scott
Blanchard, the biographer Diogenes Laertius labeled

Menippus' writing style as spoudogeloion (seriocomic), as
it combines verse and prose forms and mixes humor with

philosophical insight. It also utilizes the Cynics'
signature manner of diatribe and invective enfolded within
a dialogue or presented in the form of a mock encomium or

symposium (15). The various manifestations of folly are the
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primary targets of Menippean satire. Northrop Frye explains

that the Menippean satirist sees evil and folly as
"diseases of the mind" (309). Accordingly, Menippean satire
deals with attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies rather than
individual dispositions or temperaments; characters are

considered in terms of their "occupational approach" to

life rather than their social conduct or behavior.
Consequently, the characters of Menippean satire appear

unnatural and stylized and thus serve as spokespersons for
the philosophical practices or schools of thought they

appear to represent (Anatomy 309). More's interest in
Lucian's dialogues would profoundly influence his own work.

Like Lucian, More was interested in the potential of satire
to interrogate the presumed authority and stability of

idealized cultural traditions.

And More would accordingly

apply his knowledge of Menippean themes and techniques in
his landmark work, Utopia.

Lucian was superbly skilled at constructing humorously

satiric characters for the purposes of ironically

commenting on various features of Hellenic culture, and his
dialogues subsequently provided More with a framework for
his creation of the character Hythloday. It was likely from

Lucian's works that More discovered how to invent a satiric
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caricature in order to parody particular attitudes and

practices seen in contemporary sixteenth-century English
society. Our awareness of More's familiarity with Lucianic

techniques serves to elucidate those aspects of Hythloday's

character we initially find so perplexing and problematic.
The examination of Hythloday as a satiric persona offers a
much more insightful and rewarding understanding of his

characterological function than the traditional
interpretations that view him either as a reliable narrator

or as More's spokesperson. Hythloday's argumentative
technique in the dialogue of Book I can be viewed as an

exaggerated and parodic depiction of the dialectical method

employed by the scholastic theologians and schoolmen that
were prevalent in More's day.

The scholastic method attempted to reconcile classical

philosophy and medieval Christian theology. As Paul Oskar
Kristeller explains, medieval theologians synthesized
Biblical teachings, the writings of the early Christian

fathers,

and classical philosophical methods that appeared

compatible with Christian doctrine,

Platonic methods,

especially Stoic and

in order to "transform the subject matter

of Christian theology into a topically arranged and

logically coherent system"

(77). In their examination of
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various theological questions, the scholastics attempted to
resolve points of disagreement or contradiction through a

dialectical method that relied upon the understanding that
words can possess multiple meanings. Thus the apparent

'•6'/
ambiguity or contradictory aspect of a theological issue

could be resolved by the application of logical analysis
and argumentation. More, who advocated the humanist

position for a return to the Bible as the original source
of Christianity, vehemently opposed the scholastic method
of disputatio,

in which the scholar could argue either side

of a question with equal proficiency and with complete
disregard for determining the true or accurate position

(Satire 37).
Hythloday's argumentative techniques are presented

through a satiric rendering of the formalistic and outdated

scholastic tradition. Hythloday's rigid viewpoint and
didactic and uncooperative style reveal that he is

attempting to forcibly instruct and persuade his two
interlocutors. Rather than participating in a genuine

conversational exchange of ideas, Hythloday presents a

long-winded disputation in response to the question of
counsel. Hythloday's overwhelmingly pompous erudition and

pedantic philosophical language,
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accompanied by his

confidence in his interpretation of the scriptures in
addition to using the teachings of Plato as universal
support for his assertions,

exemplify a rhetorical style

that relies on sophistic flair rather than impartial and
unbiased observations or practical logic. Hythloday's

idealistic persona accordingly dominates the conversation.

The dialogic exchange among Hythloday,

"More," and

Giles is reminiscent of the parodic portrayal of
philosophical dialectic seen in Lucian's dialogue The

Cynic, which was among the works More translated in 1505.
Like the cynic philosopher, Hythloday,

in the role of the

philosophus gloriosus, is associated with a conventional,
if not widely respected,
In The Cynic,

scholastic intellectual tradition.

the questions posed by the curious and

unsuspecting Lycinus incite the cynic philosopher's oration
extolling the virtues of the ascetic lifestyle,

as well as

his vicious diatribe condemning the folly of humankind. Yet
throughout the course of the dialogue, the cynic

philosopher's defense of the ascetic lifestyle becomes

fixated on the virtue of the cynic's distinct physical

appearance rather than on the resilience of his moral
convictions. His tirade deteriorates further as a result of
the cynic philosopher's application of illogical reasoning,
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unfounded generalizations,
According to Branham,

and ad hominem attacks.

the humorous effect of The Cynic,

is:

... primarily a function of the particular type of

dialogue developed by Lucian that serves to
dramatize the comic inability of either speaker
to grasp fully the other's point of view because

of their absorption in distinct universes of
discourse.

(27)

A similar comic strategy using the dialogue form can

likewise be identified in Book I of Utopia.

Critics have acknowledged More's clever construction
of Hythloday as a means to effectively enable the

achievement of prosopopeia, the distinctive depiction of a
fictive persona in order to heighten the dramatization of

two opposing viewpoints. Hythloday's exaggerated and
argumentative demeanor serves to satirically accentuate the

points of conflict and opposition between his philosophical
viewpoint and the humanist viewpoint espoused by "More" and
Giles. When "More" suggests that the application of a civic

philosophy would be more suitable in the practice of
counseling kings than Hythloday's academic philosophy,

Hythloday employs the specious methodology of the
scholastics by resorting to a priori universals: the
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scriptures and the teachings of Plato. And when "More"

questions the practicality and efficacy of a social order
based on the community of property, Hythloday does not

offer a clear and sensible response that would serve to
answer or address "More's" justifiable concerns.

Instead,

he brushes them aside viewing "More's" concerns as proof of

his ignorance: "I marvel not that you be of this opinion.
For you conceive in your mind either none at all, or else a

very false image and similitude of this thing"

(126). He

likewise claims to have access to exclusive knowledge of

such a social system and thus proceeds to offer his
illustration of Utopia. As Gerard Wegemer explains,

Hythloday's response demonstrates the extent of his

gnosticism.1 Rather than presenting evidence in support of

his assertions that would function on a mutually
comprehensible level with "More" and Giles, Hythloday

claims to possess esoteric information to which no one else
has access

(302).

In spite of Hythloday's ability to comment on
England's social problems,

the gnostic and cynical aspects

1 The island of Utopia alludes to the influences of gnostic
philosophy; Hythloday refers to the name of the country before
Utopus' arrival as "Abraxa." According to Sacks, this Greek name
was "given by the second-century Greek gnostic Basilides to the
highest of the 365 heavens that he posited" (128n).
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of his attitude underscore his removed and disinterested

attitude. The degree of Hythloday's lack of involvement
with the customs and practices of European society, and
with the opinions and concerns held by "More" and Giles,

are reinforced early in the dialogue of Book I.

In addition

to his role as enigmatic traveler long dispatched to

various parts unknown, Hythloday has gone to lengths to
ensure that no relations or ties would oblige him to act in
any way contrary to the principles of his rigid,

formalistic rationalism. When "More" and Giles suggest that

Hythloday might enter the service of a king in order to be
of some use to his relatives and friends, he explains:
As concerning my friends and kinfolk,

greatly for them,

I pass not

for I think I have sufficiently

done my part towards them already. For these
things.,

that other men do not depart from until

they be old and sick ... those very same things did
I, being not only lusty and in good health but

also in the flower of my youth, divide among my
friends and kinfolk, which I think with this my
liberality ought to hold them contented,

to require nor to look that besides this,
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and not
I

should for their sakes give myself in bondage

unto kings.

(95)

This physical and emotional detachment is a condition

specific to a distinct kind of satiric persona; it enables

such characters,

through the outward guise of objectivity,

to launch into a caustic harangue in their criticism of

society, while at the same time presuming themselves
superior to the human behaviors and social practices they
vehemently condemn. Lucian's cynic philosopher implicitly

refers to himself when he declares: "Accordingly the Gods

have no needs,
Gods"

and those men the fewest who are nearest

(par. 12). Likewise, Hythloday appears to have few

worldly needs,

concerns, or associations, and thus appears

concentrated on achieving the degree of "otherworldliness"

supposedly attained by those of the ascetic frame of mind.
Therefore he exhibits no affection, concern, or
responsibility toward his fellow man.

In fact, Hythloday's

argument in favor of withdrawal is founded in large part on

a desire to remain isolated and detached:

Now I live at liberty after mine own mind and
pleasure, which I think very few of these great
states and peers of realms can say. Yea,

and

there be enough of them that sue for great men's
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friendships and,

therefore,

I think it no great

hurt if they have not me, nor three of four such
others as I am.

(95)

Hythloday's disillusionment with conventional European
society gives way to a preference for idealism and

independence. As Hythloday becomes more vigorous in his

assertions, his evidence moves from the factual

account of dinner with Cardinal Morton),

(his

to the

increasingly hypothetical and imaginary (his supposed

scenarios involving invented kings and counsels),

completely fantastic and esoteric

to the

(his exclusive knowledge

of unfamiliar societies and of the island of Utopia)

(Kinney 81).
Yet More goes beyond the parodic send-up of Lucian's
cynic philosopher. Hythloday's character is one of the
fundamental elements that testifies to the incredible

breadth of complexity More is able to achieve in Utopia.
For More deliberately problematizes the character of

Hythloday,

lest we become completely captivated by his

righteous indignation and high moral deportment,

or feel

inclined to write him off as a mere caricature of

scholastic pedantry. He is unlike Erasmus' Dame Folly, who,
after she offers an oration in praise of herself, directly
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refers to the folly of her attendants.

of Moriae,

In the second half

Folly is hardly ambiguous in her scrutiny of

human foolishness and vice. In fact,

as Reynolds explains:

"It is now the direct voice of Erasmus rather than Erasmus

speaking by the mouth o.f Folly. The transition is
skillfully done, but a harsher note is sounded"

(70). While

the motivation underlying Folly's ironical pronouncements
is more easily discerned as she continues her oration,

in

Utopia, Hythloday remains a consistent instrument of More's
skillful use of irony and carefully constructed ambiguity.

In spite of our suspicion of Hythloday's reliability,
insofar as Hythloday,

at times,

seems to espouse humanist

principles, we are never quite certain when we will need to
reverse what he is saying; we are only certain that we will
invariably be forced to confront the irony embedded in his
discourse.
One such instance of multi-layered irony is in his

account of dinner with Cardinal Morton whereby he offers

his critique of European society. Hythloday's discussion

regarding the suitable punishment of thieves,

the

ostentation and greed of aristocrats and merchants that
contribute to rising poverty among farmers,

tradesmen,

and

laborers, and the hypocrisy and corrupt behavior of rulers
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and state officials echoes the humanist interest in social
reform. However,

the accuracy of Hythloday's assessment is

undercut by the fact that he offers this account as

evidence for his argument in favor of withdrawal from
political service,

and for his assertion that counselors

would not be interested in his sensible advice,

in spite of

the fact that Cardinal Morton is clearly the exception to
this generalization. Hythloday compliments the gracious and

eloquent Cardinal in spite of the fact that Cardinal's
demeanor and behavior are contrary to his preference for
strict and unyielding counsel. This sort of multi-layered
irony serves to heighten the complexity of Hythloday's

characterological function within the dialogue.

In the same instance in which Hythloday delivers his
critique of European society, he includes an account that

is of profound importance specifically for the reader of

Utopia.

In summing up his account of dinner with Cardinal

Morton, when the other attendants at the table praise
Hythloday's suggestions solely because they appear to be
endorsed by the Cardinal, Hythloday launches into a
seemingly incidental digression recounting the quarrel that

erupts between a "certain jesting parasite" and a friar who
is also a "graduate in divinity," both of whom are also

7'8

present at the table. Hythloday recollects the event
casually enough:

I cannot tell whether it were best to rehearse
the communication that followed, for it was not
very sad [serious]. But yet you shall hear it,

for there was no evil in it, and partly it

pertained to the matter before said.

(Ill)

Hythloday then offers a peculiar introduction for the
parasite:

There chanced to stand by a certain jesting
parasite, or scoffer, which would seem to
resemble and counterfeit the fool. But he did in

such wise counterfeit that he was almost the very
same indeed that he labored to represent. He so
studied with words and sayings brought forth so

out of time and place to make sport and move
laughter that he himself was oftener laughed at

than his jests were.

(Ill)

(emphasis added)

As Hythloday's description indicates, he is incapable of a
more nuanced assessment of the parasite's function; he

cannot quite distinguish the difference between a genuine
fool and one who would "counterfeit the fool." Hythloday
naively interprets the parasite's ability to provoke
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laughter as an indication of his foolish awkwardness,

and

he believes the parasite's occasionally successful

exhibitions of cleverness to be merely the result of luck.
After Hythloday and the Cardinal discuss the possibilities

for restructuring the laws regarding the treatment of

thieves and vagabonds, one of their party wonders aloud how
they might deal with those who are fallen into poverty as a
result of old age or infirmity and are therefore unable to

work to earn a living. The parasite ironically suggests
that these types of needy persons might be sent to the

monasteries to become nuns and laypersons. The friar sees
this as a jest at the expense of secular monks and priests,

so he makes his own attempt at a witty quip. However,

the

parasite adroitly turns the friar's remark against him by

equating the mendicant friars with vagabonds. When the
guests see that the Cardinal does not disapprove of the

parasite's retort,

they join in laughter at the friar's

expense.
Hythloday offers this account as evidence in support

of a particular assertion; again, he refers to the
disingenuous response of the courtiers and counselors who

mistakenly support the parasite's comic suggestions only
after the Cardinal responds favorably to his jesting.
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However,

the reader is able to discern Hythloday's

digression as evidence of something much more significant.
On one level, the digression functions as another
opportunity for More to satirize the specious methodology

and routinely spiteful behavior of the pedantic theologian
who relies on his universals - the scriptures - as the
means to counter the parasite's taunts and refute his
implicit accusations. Moreover, the parasite proceeds to

enrage the theologian to such a degree with his clever
jesting that the indignant theologian resorts to hurling

boorish insults. As Hythloday relates, the friar was:
... in such a rage that he could not refrain

himself from chiding,

scolding,

railing,

and

reviling. He called the fellow ribald, villain,

javel, backbiter,
perdition,

citing,

slanderer,
therewith,

and child of

terrible

threatenings out of Holy Scripture.

(112)

The friar's response only stimulates further concentrated
jesting and ridicule from the parasite. As Hythloday

recounts: "Then the jesting scoffer began to play the
scoffer indeed,

and, verily, he was good at it,

for he

could play a part In that play no man better" (112)
(emphasis added). The resultant commentary emerges: the
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parasite may be,

as Hythloday implies,

"playing the fool,"

yet he maintains his composure, while the seemingly learned
friar loses all sense of poise and self-control,

and thus

reveals himself to be the genuine fool.
And yet the digression works, on an even subtler level

by providing a clue to the underlying rhetorical strategy
in Utopia. Hythloday inadvertently offers a description of
a character,

ways,

the friar/theologian, whose role is,

in some

analogous to his own. Similar to the theologian's

response to the parasite's statements,

the concerns raised

by "More" provoke Hythloday to resort to personal attacks

aimed at "More's" character, and to appeal to scholastic

universals - his interpretations of Plato and the
scriptures - which are likewise manipulated and taken out
of context in order to support his assertions,

ironically

resulting in the degradation of Christian and philosophical

doctrines. While Hythloday uses the digression to
illustrate the impediments to sensible and productive

discussion among courtiers,

as Branham points out,

the

Cardinal's reaction serves as an example of how we should

approach the ironic, humorous,

and outwardly ambivalent

discourse presented in Utopia: "For the Cardinal's own more

adept responses serve implicitly as a model of the very
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interpretive skills Utopia requires of its readers"; thus

More requires readers to construe a sophisticated and

learned jest and to be able to distinguish the profound and
provocative aspects of Hythloday's discourse that are
enfolded in language that appears superficially humorous

and whimsical

(33).

Early in his literary career, More also translated

Menippus, another dialogue by Lucian, whereby he would
become familiar with another trope of Lucianic seriocomedy:

the theatrum mundi - the dramatic metaphor of "life as a
stage play" - the notion that humans are constantly engaged

in role-playing. More, who greatly appreciated Lucian's

adroit sense of humor, would adapt this trope for his own
work Utopia.

In Menippus,

the title character grows up

listening to the stories of the Gods written by the poets

Hesiod and Homer. The poets'

tales describe the Gods'

violent and rapacious behavior; yet when Menippus becomes a
man, he discovers that human laws contradict the poets and

forbid the depraved behavior exhibited by the Gods.

To

resolve his confusion, Menippus seeks out the philosophers

in order that they, as he explains,

"would make what they

would of me and give me a plain and reliable map of life"
(158). Yet to his dismay, he finds the philosophers
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advocate differing and contradictory principles in response

to his question. Furthermore, he observes: "that the
practice of these same people was diametrically opposed to

their precepts"

(159). Disappointed by the absurdity and

duplicity of the philosophers' methods, Menippus undertakes
a journey to the underworld in search of Tiresias, the

blind seer of Thebes,

to learn the best kind of life.

During his journey through the underworld, Menippus

observes the dead, many of them celebrated heroes and
rulers of ancient Greece, only now they possess none of the
distinguishing characteristics that made them remarkable in

life,

such as wealth,

fame,

and beauty. This leads Menippus

to a profound realization regarding the condition of
humankind:

... the life of man came before me under the

likeness of a great pageant, arranged and
marshalled by Chance, who distributed infinitely

varied costumes to the performers. She would take
one and array him like a king ... another she

dressed like a slave; one was adorned with
beauty,

another got a ridiculous hunchback; there

must be all kinds in the show.
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(164)

With a similar stage metaphor in mind, in Book I of Utopia,

"More" advocates the use of a more civil philosophy that
"knoweth ... her own stage," and emphasizes the merits of
role-playing for'the purposes of providing useful counsel.

Furthermore, "More's" practical advice echoes the

importance Tiresias places on common sense and expediency
when he finally offers, by whispering in Menippus' ear, his
view of the best way of life:

The life of the ordinary man is the best and most
prudent choice; cease from the folly of
metaphysical speculation and inquiry into origins

and ends, utterly reject their clever logic,

count all these things idle talk, and pursue one
end alone - how you may do what your hand finds
to do, and go your way with ever a smile and

never a passion.

(167)

By questioning Hythloday's radical assertions, "More"
begins to target his intolerant fanaticism and the futility

of his idealistic philosophy. In spite of Hythloday's

academic logic and high moral purpose, the practicality of
"More's" advice resonates with the reader.

Of course Hythloday cannot perceive the significance
that the role-playing metaphor might have on his
85

understanding of the nature of human action and behavior.

When "More" suggests the use of a more civic approach to
counsel, Hythloday cannot conceive of the tangible
circumstances that would make his idealistic vision
impossible to achieve. Because of the lengths Hythloday has

gone to in order to remain detached from the European

social order, he lacks the ability to comprehend the

complexities of human existence,

and the ability to ponder

the full range of factors that contribute to the inevitable
need to fulfill specific roles in life,

perhaps,

such as counselor

for the sake of appropriateness,

efficacy,

and

expediency. As he demonstrates earlier in his account of
the parasite, who eventually began to "play the scoffer

indeed ... for he could play a part in that play no man
better," Hythloday cannot distinguish when a person might
perform in a particular role in order to accomplish a

specific objective.
friar,

In the case of the parasite and the

the parasite uses the fool's comic mask to

ironically,

and accurately,

comment upon the hypocrisy and

arrogance exhibited by the theologian. Hythloday,

courtiers at Cardinal Morton's table,

is oblivious to the

ironic subtext of the parasite's discourse.
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like the

While "More" and Giles patiently endure Hythloday's
long-winded oration and sophistical argumentation,

they do

not appear entirely convinced at the end of the dialogue.
Hythloday's assertion of Utopia's superiority to European

societies elicits from "More" a justifiable degree of
doubt,

as well as a genuine curiosity in regard to how a

society based upon the community of property could

conceivably function. Yet it is Giles who seems to undergo

the more drastic change - from enthusiastic admirer to
something more resembling the Lucianic scoffer.

Initially,

Giles is impressed by Hythloday's vast knowledge,

and this

amazement is what leads to the debate on counsel:

I wonder greatly why you get you not into some
king's court? For I am sure there is no prince

living that would not be glad of you as a man not
only able highly to delight him with your

profound learning, and this your knowledge of
countries and peoples, but also meet to instruct

him with examples and help him with counsel.

(94)

However, by the close of the dialogue, when Hythloday

appeals to his esoteric knowledge in his praise of Utopian

institutions and practices: "if you had been with me in
Utopia and had presently seen their fashions and laws,
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as I

did ... then doubtless you would grant that you never saw a

people well ordered, but only there..." Now, Giles is overtly

skeptical: "it shall be hard for you to make me believe
that there is better order in that new land than is here in

these countries that we know,
as there"

(126). Likewise,

for good wits be as well here

the reader of Utopia anticipates

the discourse in Book II with a measure of genuine
curiosity,

although perhaps mixed with a commensurate

amount of skepticism.
Since Utopian practices and institutions appear,
least on a superficial level,

at

to successfully eliminate the

social ills pointed out by Hythloday in Book I, we may be
tempted to embrace his description of Utopia as a model

commonwealth. However, the ironic subtext underlying
Hythloday's discourse results in numerous-absurdities and
contradictions that frustrate any inclination to interpret

Utopia as a literal ideal. While we might lose sight of the
fact that Hythloday is,

in essence, presenting an encomium

in praise of an imaginary "No Place," a fact that becomes
troubling every time it comes to mind,, it is equally

confounding to realize that Utopian society appears to be

disturbingly xenophobic and misanthropic. The geographic
characteristics of Utopia and England are strikingly
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similar,

and certainly sixteenth-century England did

historically exhibit a measure of insularity; however,

the

Utopians go to great lengths to ensure their island's
impenetrability. For example,

the bay of Utopia is filled

with dangerous rocks just below the water's surface, making

it possible for only native Utopians to navigate the

channels successfully. Therefore strangers must necessarily
have the accompaniment of a Utopian guide. Yet it appears
that when Utopus,

the country's legendary founder,

conquered the country, he was not satisfied with the land's
natural defenses. Before his arrival,

the land he conquered

was attached to the mainland with an isthmus. To further
ensure the country's seclusion, Utopus ordered the strip of

land to be dug up: "For King Utopus ... caused fifteen miles
space of uplandish ground, where the sea had no passage,
be cut and digged up,

the land"

to

and so brought the sea round about

(128-9). Yet,

in spite of the Utopians' distaste

and distrust of peoples or customs unknown and unfamiliar,

these sensibilities do nothing to prevent their aggressive
sense of entitlement. Without a moment's hesitation,

Utopians,

the

as part of their population regulatory practices

will establish a colony on the mainland. Should the native

inhabitants refuse to live as ordered under the Utopian law
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appointed by the colonists,

the Utopians simply drive the

inhabitants out of their native land: "And if they resist
and rebel,

then [the Utopians] make war against them,

for

they count this the most just cause of war, when any people

holdeth a piece of ground void and vacant to no good nor
profitable use ..."
Furthermore,

(142) .

this misanthropic sentiment is not only

manifested by a xenophobic reaction toward other peoples

and cultures; it is also directed inward,

influencing the

way the Utopians behave toward one another. Nowhere is this
more clearly displayed than in the Utopian patriarchal

family unit. Harry Berger,

Jr. identifies the function of

the Utopian political system in the formation of an
obedient and docile population by way of social

institutions the are designed to assist the interests of
"misanthropic self-deception"

(271) . Utopia is presented as

a happy and contented society since its system ensures that
there will never be a shortage of essential goods and

nothing is ever to be given in exchange for what is needed.

In this way,

as Hythloday announces: "the whole island is

as it were one family or household"

(148). However, Berger

sees the Utopian family unit as an extension of the civil
government and,

ironically, as an example of Utopian
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misanthropy - the deliberate attempt to encourage
detachment and prohibit the formation of abiding familial

bonds among relatives.

According to Berger:

... the Utopian mentality treats the private

family space as a potential seedbed of conspiracy

against the state, a place in which the constant

face-to-face relationships enable people to keep
their backs to the world,

confide in each other,

share secrets, and hatch plots.

Hence,

(282)

the quality of philia that leads to reciprocity,

support,

and cooperation among members of a nuclear family

is pre-empted and forcibly redirected to the larger
society. The result is the various,

and disturbingly

impersonal, Utopian practices that serve to benefit the
good of the society rather than autonomous,

sustained families,

individually

such as moving and separating families

at will for purposes of population control and regulation,
the rotating system of rural and urban laborers,

and the

essentially mandatory practice of communal meals.
A more thorough examination of Utopia's institutions

and practices reveals a variety of absurd and troubling

elements that would appear to contradict the status of
Utopian society as an "ideal." In addition to their
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suspicious view of family relationships, they also exhibit
an equally cynical view of the marriage relationship and
the human capacity for romantic love, which results in a
pre-marital practice that even Hythloday acknowledges as

completely ridiculous. When choosing marriage partners, the
prospective bride and groom are displayed to each other,

under the supervision of a respectable woman and man,
completely naked. The Utopians compare the selection of a

mate to the practice of purchasing livestock only after a

thorough inspection has been made, lest some sore or lesion
be hidden by the saddle or some other covering. Thus a

woman's beauty cannot be determined merely by the
attractiveness of her face or hands. The reason for this
practice, as Hythloday explains, is founded on the fact
that some undisclosed offensive or disgusting feature may

result in the hatred of married partners toward each other

for the rest of their lives:
For all men be not so wise as to have respect to

the virtuous conditions of the party, and the

endowments of the body cause the virtues of the
mind more to be esteemed and regarded, yea, even
in the marriages of wise men. Verily, so foul

deformity may be hid under those coverings that
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it may quite alienate and take away the man's
mind from his wife, when it shall not be lawful
for their bodies to be separate again.

(170)

Yet this obsession with bodily appearance, and potentially
offensive deformities or abnormalities,

seems to be in

outright opposition to the Utopian principle that considers

the use of cosmetics for the purposes of improving one's
beauty to be a prideful and detestable practice. Hythloday

explains this attitude only a few pages after the
discussion of Utopian marriage customs:

For they know even by very experience that no
comeliness of beauty doth so highly commend and

advance the wives in the conceit of their
husbands as honest conditions and lowliness. For
love is oftentimes won with beauty,

kept, preserved,

obedience.

so it is not

and continued but by virtue and

(172)(emphasis added)

While the Utopians are so anxious about the potential for

the body to provoke disgust that they consider it an
absolute necessity to base the entire decision of marriage

on the examination of prospective partners in full

nakedness, Hythloday nevertheless attempts to assert that

virtue and obedience are esteemed more highly in Utopian
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society than physical beauty. With Hythloday's seeming
unawareness of the contradictory implications of his

descriptions of Utopian practices, one cannot help but feel
that he is making things up as he goes along and,

doing,

in so

loses sight of the resulting paradoxes that emerge,

or else that he is so blindly enamored of Utopian society
that these problematic elements simply do not occur to
him,

and therefore he does not consider them worth

accounting for.
Another example of inconsistency in Utopia is
demonstrated in their philosophy of war. According to

Hythloday, the Utopians despise war:
War or battle, as a thing very beastly and yet to
no kind of beasts in so much use as to man,

they

do detest and abhor. And contrary to the custom

almost of all other nations, they count nothing

so much against glory as glory gotten in war.
(177)

What would seem to follow is a description of a tranquil,

pacifist society. However, Hythloday goes on to describe in
some detail a society that spends a majority of its "free
time" involved in military training,

exercises,

and games,

that involve the entire family in the act of combat, and in
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public triumphs when they have skillfully and deceitfully

overcome an enemy. Furthermore, for a people that detest
war, Hythloday relates their preference for battle-axes as
opposed to swords, as they "be mortal as well in sharpness

as in weight, both for foins [thrusts] and downstrokes"

(184). They also excel in laying ambushes and in their
invention of machines of war. They claim to despise war,
yet ironically they unscrupulously hire mercenaries, offer
bribes, and plot assassinations in order to subdue their

enemies. The Utopians are revealed to be a hostile, meanspirited, and emotionally vacant people who are aggressive

in their self-defense as well as in maintaining their
dominance among neighboring nations. Apparently, the
Utopian's have participated in warfare often enough to have
accumulated from their conquered enemies a great deal of

wealth and a large number of landed estates in numerous

different countries. In his recounting of the Utopian

methods of warfare, Hythloday is ironically oblivious to
the fact that they rely on many of the very same methods

employed by European societies, which he condemns in

Book I.
Thus the dichotomy Hythloday establishes at the outset

of his discourse on Utopia begins to break down. His
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assertion that Utopian society is superior to European

society begins to lose its hold on us as we come to
recognize that some of their practices are not only

ludicrous, but also largely impractical. As Branham
observes,

the comic paradoxes are "generated by the sheer

consistency of the Utopians' utilitarian logic"

(34). The

utilitarian ideology that underlies Utopian institutions is
primarily concerned with maximizing the good for the

greatest number of people, meaning that egalitarianism must
be preserved at all costs. Consequently,

the Utopians are

fanatical in their practice of the equitable distribution

of all resources,

including food,

clothing,

goods,

and

land. A utilitarian ethic also includes the evaluation of
actions and conduct based on the principle of

consequentialism: the view that the results of a given
action or policy are what ultimately matter,

and that the

outcome is what establishes the acceptance of one action or

policy over another. Accordingly,

actions are determined

purely by their eventual consequences rather than the means

by which such ends are achieved. This ideology explains,
part, many of the Utopians'

seemingly hostile behaviors and

impersonal traditions. Likewise,

point of view in Book I,

in

similar to Hythloday's

the absurdities that result from a
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strictly rationalistic approach reveal the Utopians'

lack

of a nuanced sensibility that would be capable of

contemplating the actions and behavior of humans as they
are realistically expressed in a material and ultimately

flawed world.

While Hythloday claims that the Utopians' utilitarian
ideology has evidently resulted in some advantageous and
beneficial effects,

it has also resulted in the Utopians'

distinct, culturally contingent attitudes toward gold and
silver. The Utopian social order is built upon the belief
that the accumulation of private property is the primary

cause of social disorder and chaos,

corruption,

and for the greed,

and arrogance exhibited among people. However,

insofar as they are required to maintain a store of wealth

(for how else do you go about hiring mercenaries, offering
bribes,

and financing assassination attempts?),

guard against the estimation of gold,

silver,

they must

and jewels as

valuable commodities and therefore desirable to possess. To
accomplish this,

the Utopians inflate the practical

function of iron as a stronger, more superior,

and more

easily attainable mineral than gold or silver. At the same

time, they attempt to devalue precious jewels by giving
them to children to play with as toys, and to lessen the
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appeal of gold and silver by using them to fashion common
necessities and for marking slaves:

... of gold and silver they make commonly chamber
pots and other vessels that serve for most vile

uses, not only in their, common halls but in every
man's private house. Furthermore, of the same

metals they make great chains,

fetters,

and gyves

wherein they tie their bondmen. Finally,

whosoever for any offense be infamed, by their
ears hang rings of gold, upon their fingers they
wear rings of gold,

of gold ...

and about their necks chains

(150)

One might wonder about the efficacy and practicality of
chains made from gold,

a relatively soft metal,

to use for

the purposes of restraining slaves and criminals. Further,

one can discern how the Utopians' treatment of precious
metals and stones and the great lengths they go to diminish

the value of gold and silver serve to paradoxically
highlight their complete and utter fascination with them.

Such comic paradoxes function in Book II to frustrate

any sense of an emerging ideal. Throughout Hythloday's
discourse, we are forced to consider a moderating third

view, one that considers the valid points of Hythloday's
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argument in relation to his fanatical idealism, and
considers the humanist argument voiced by "More" and Giles
in relation to their skeptical response to Hythloday's

assertions. In addition, we are engaged in a process of
evaluating Utopian institutions and practices from the

perspective of the subject positions we inhabit and from
those cultural systems in which we are invested. To
emphasize this aspect of Utopia's rhetorical strategy, More

includes a digression in Hythloday's discussion of the

Utopians'

attitude toward gold and silver. Similar to the

digression of the parasite and friar in Book I, Hythloday
offers an anecdote in Book II detailing the arrival in
Amaurote of the Anemolian ambassadors who are arrayed in
gold,

jewels, and fine clothing, and are unaware of the

Utopians' disdain for wealth and ostentation.
But the Anemolians, because they dwell far thence

and had very little acquaintance with them,

hearing that they were all appareled alike and
that very rudely and homely,

thinking them not to

have the things which they did not wear, being

therefore more proud than wise,

determined in the

gorgeousness of their apparel to represent very

gods and with bright shining and glittering of
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their gay clothing to dazzle the eyes of the poor
Utopians.

(151)

The Utopians, mistaking the elaborately dressed ambassadors

for slaves and fools,

greet the Anemolian servants as their

distinguished guests. Insofar as the Anemolians appear to
possess assumptions similar to Europeans,

the digression

serves Hythloday's idealizing perspective and functions as
evidence of the folly of European society and to reinforce

the superiority of Utopian ideology. However,

the

digression also serves to highlight the subtle satiric

perspective of Book II. According to Branham,

the satiric

perspective emerges as an effect of "viewing European
practice in light of Utopian rationality"

(34). Thus More

satirizes European society by having their Anemolian
surrogates, who arrogantly presume to dazzle the Utopians

with their finery, presented as the object of Utopian

laughter and ridicule.
Yet this satiric perspective serves a more significant
purpose in Utopia. As Branham explains,

the humor of the

anecdote is the result of a distinctively Lucianic form
that depends upon "juxtaposing in a single context two

divergent cultural perspectives"

(36). Hythloday's

digression destabilizes the readers' perception of the
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authority of prevailing cultural orthodoxies and
conventions. It problematizes the tendency to view any

social practice or tradition as "natural," recognizing them

instead to be products of cultural construction and

reinforcement. Thus, while the Anemolians acknowledge gold
as possessing a "natural" or objective value,

the Utopians

reject this view entirely. Should we feel inclined to
embrace Utopian moral philosophy as a valid interpretation

of life "according to nature," we need only to recall the
account of the Anemolian ambassadors to comprehend the

arbitrary condition of cultural systems of practice.
Because More was clever enough to construct a Utopian

perspective in contrast to apparently European attitudes,
we become aware of the fact that while Utopia's ironic

subtext leads us to identify Utopian practices as

impractical and absurd, the Utopians would just as likely

laugh at our cultural practices and beliefs and find them
to be ridiculous as well.

Interestingly, the digression of the Anemolian

ambassadors comes just before Hythloday's discussion of

Utopian moral philosophy. The Utopians claim the "just"

life as the most pleasurable and,
pleasure,

furthermore,

that virtue,

and a devotion to the common good are the natural
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products of philosophic rationalism. However, as happiness

is the Utopians' primary concern and is consequently
derived from a life devoted to pleasure, their system also

espouses a naturalized hierarchy of pleasures that ranks

the pleasures of the body below the pleasures of the mind.

And within the category of bodily pleasures, the pleasure
of eliminating excess falls below the pleasures of the
harmonious state of physical health. In Utopian philosophy,
the elimination of excess equates such actions as
defecation or relieving an itch by scratching with sexual

intercourse, the discharging of semen into the woman for

the purposes of generating children. Insofar as satiric

discourse customarily relies upon the anatomy of the

grotesque in order to reduce the self-inflated perception
of humankind, the Utopian fascination with the body may
serve as another indication of Utopia's Menippean
influences. As seen in their moral philosophy, which

focuses a great deal on the hierarchical ordering of bodily

functions, and their premarital customs, which demonstrates
their obsession with potentially disgusting physical
imperfections, the Utopians reveal their fixation on the
animalistic and grotesque aspects of human nature in both

their sacred and ritualistic practices.
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Throughout Utopia, More cleverly adapts Lucianic

themes and techniques and in so doing, displays his own

adroit sense of humor,

as well as his appreciation for an

amusing jest and lively intellectual activity. His ironic

commentary,

aimed at scholastic theologians,

philosophy,

and the abuses of European society,

idealistic

is executed

with a tremendous degree of skill and poise. Indeed he
shared this skill and appreciation with his good friend

Erasmus, who demonstrated his own clever sense of humor in

Encomium Moriae. In the prefatory letter to the Frobenius
edition of Moriae (1515), Giradus Listrius makes the
following observation:

... there are truly things in it which cannot be
understood except by the learned and attentive ...
partly on account of the allusions both frequent

and silently present,

and partly because of the

clever subtlety which cannot be easily sensed ...

For there is nothing requiring more talent than

to joke learnedly.
The observation can be similarly made in regard to More's

Utopia. Both works were certainly composed with the intent
to inspire vigorous intellectual inspection and debate. Yet

while the motivations underlying Erasmus' use of satire and
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irony are relatively discernable,

to the extent that his

work elicited an outraged and indignant response from the

Louvain theologians, More's own "voice" in Utopia is rather
obscure. Thus the complexity and subtlety of irony in
More's work seems to surpass even that of the paradoxical

Moriae. In addition to identifying the targets of More's
satiric commentary,

the reader is actively involved in the

practice of assaying the two sides presented of the debate

on counsel, as well as grappling with the humanist and
idealistic assertions of the seemingly contradictory and

problematic spokesperson, Hythloday. The intricacies of

Utopia perplex and confound. Yet there is the sense that
More composed Utopia not merely for intellectual amusement.
He intentionally "counterfeits the fool," but with a
definite purpose in mind. As Reynolds explains, both More

and Erasmus were interested in more than composing literary

works purely for the purposes of entertainment. Their works

were expressions of their powerful convictions and deeply
held beliefs:
All their mature work was an expression of their
belief in the importance of Christian morals and
the wisdom of Christ. It was part of their

achievement to show that wit and humour,
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satire

and irony, could all be used in the service of
righteousness,

not synonymous.

and that dullness and goodness are
(68)

However, while Utopia may allow us to catch a glimpse of
More's genuine beliefs, he deliberately refuses to offer us
any clear indication of his intent. Thus we can conclude,

in the very least,

that part of his fundamental aim was to

obscure his own position, or any authoritative position for
that matter,

to the extent that the reader would be forced

to grapple with the ramifications involved in any attempt
to envision and construct an ideal commonwealth. As More

chose to include his namesake within the fictive frame of

Utopia and, at the same time, endeavored to keep any overt
references to his own argumentative viewpoint outside the
confines of his innovative work,

the rhetorical strategy of

Utopia accordingly reflects the spirit of a man who enjoyed
a good joke and a witty jest, but who was also reserved,

profoundly serious,

and exceedingly private about many of

his beliefs.
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CHAPTER FOUR

"WHAT PART SOEVER YOU HAVE TAKEN UPON YOU":

THE COMPLEX FACETS OF UTOPIA AND ITS CREATOR

From his early years, Thomas More appeared destined
for a life of public service,

if not by inclination,

then

certainly by virtue of his family tradition. His father,

Sir John More, had been a successful lawyer and judge and
was resolute in his wish that his son likewise pursue a

legal career. After completing law school at Lincoln's Inn
in roughly 1500,

Thomas More began his career as a

barrister and maintained a prosperous legal practice. By
1510, More was appointed as Undersheriff of London and was

thus fully ensconced in his vocation as a competent lawyer

and civic administrator. As Undersheriff, More presided
over the Sheriff's Court where he arbitrated in all manner
of cases and countless litigation proceedings involving
diverse crimes and offenses, disputes over commercial

matters, property,

and possessions,

and the honoring of

debts or other obligations. More's position also obliged

him to serve as London's chief legal advisor in matters

related to the effective maintenance and administration of
city affairs. His reputation as a fair and proficient
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arbiter,

and as an eloquent and gifted orator, was widely

acknowledged and resulted in additional appointments to

various councils and committees. Accordingly,

in 1515, when

commercial disputes flared between England and the Low
Countries, More was a sensible choice to accompany the

diplomatic embassy to the Netherlands.

More's steadily advancing political career suggests a
temperament that was vigorously devoted to public duty. And

his experience as a lawyer and as Undersheriff provided him
with specialized knowledge of civic and commercial matters,

which provided him, during the course of his six-month
sojourn in the Netherlands,

the opportunity to invent

Utopia's detailed political and socio-economic structure.
While the organization of More's imaginary island-nation
may initially appear feasible,

as we have seen, More

infuses the discourse of Utopia with enough comic irony and
absurdity to deliberately frustrate the reader's
inclination to accept Hythloday's proposal of Utopia as an

"ideal commonwealth." At the same time,

Utopia has

traditionally been regarded as a profoundly personal work a work that reflects the dilemmas of its author. Thus in

addition to being argued that Book II serves as a model of

More's conception of an ideal commonwealth,
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it is also

widely considered that the debate dramatized in Book I

between "More" and Hythloday reflects More's uncertainty
and indecision over embarking on a career in royal counsel.
Cardinal Wolsey and King Henry VIII offered More a position

in the king's service in January 1516, and this event
ostensibly motivated the composition of Book I. More had
already largely completed what is known as Book II of

Utopia by the time of his return from the Netherlands to
England in October of 1515. Insofar as More had been

serving tirelessly as a civic administrator since 1510,

it

seems reasonable to expect his abiding commitment to public
service. Accordingly, we can understand the debate in
Book I as not merely exploring the question of withdrawal

or engagement in relation to public service in general;

rather the debate grapples with the implications of these
two courses of action specifically in regard to the issue
of service as counselor to the king.

If Book I was intended to provide a forum for More to
work out the complicated question of counsel for himself,

then what is perhaps more remarkable than More's ability to
dramatize two sides of the argument - one in favor and the

other against royal service - is his ability to do so
without offering any clear verdict of his own deliberations
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on the subject.

Indeed the offer from Wolsey and Henry VIII

would have left More with much to consider. He was well

respected as Undersheriff, and his private legal practice
had been steadily flourishing; he would have to resign
these positions were he to enter the king's service. Also,

his intellectual and scholarly interests would obviously
have to go by the wayside,

as the interests of the king

would become his first priority. Furthermore, he was
undoubtedly aware of the propensity for corruption and the

abuse of power in royal affairs. Certainly these are among
the considerations that would have given him pause.

However,

in the autumn of 1516, More was appointed to the

Council of the Star Chamber where his successful appearance

and performance in legal proceedings were consistently

observed by Cardinal Wolsey. In the meantime, More
completed Book I. of Utopia,

and the first edition was

published in Louvain in December of 1516. More's

accomplishments as an arbiter and examiner in the Council
of the Star Chamber only earned him greater recognition,

and he was entreated by Wolsey and Henry VIII all the more
fervently to become a member of the king's court.

In 1517,

More embarked on a second diplomatic embassy, this time to
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Calais,

to resolve commercial disputes that had arisen

between England and France.
The suggestion that Book I provided More with a means
to explore the possible courses of action in response to

the king's offer is further supported by the traditional
belief that More was reluctant to enter the king's service.
Some evidence exists that seems to support this assertion.

More's reluctance to serve as Henry VIII's counselor is

reportedly confirmed by Erasmus, who seemed to give the
impression in his letters that More was practically
"dragged" into the king's service

(Guy 48).1 Also, Erasmus'

disapproval of More's decision to accept Henry VIII's offer

is also widely received as fact; as E.E. Reynolds states:
"Erasmus opposed any such engagement and he always
regretted that More eventually became a Councillor"

(116).

Indeed More did delay in accepting the offer. In a letter

he wrote to Erasmus in February 1516, More relates the

details of the proposal and explains his reasons for

refusing it:

This, however,
shall,

I think,

I have hitherto refused,

and

continue to do so, because,

if I

1 John Guy offers an engaging and insightful exploration of the
traditional view of Thomas More as a "reluctant courtier" in
Chapter 3 of his biography Thomas More, pages 42-61.
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took it, the place I now hold in the City, which
I prefer to higher office, would either have to

be given up, or retained, much to my regret, with

some offence to the citizens, who, if they had
any dispute with the government, as sometimes

happens, about their privileges, would have less
confidence in me as a paid pensioner of the King.

(qtd in Reynolds 115)
As his explanation reveals, More's refusal was not

necessarily the result of uncertainty over the issue of
royal service; rather, it was in relation to his steadfast
commitment to the citizens of London, whose interests he
felt it was his duty to administer and defend.

Yet other facets of More's life lead some to believe
that he may have favored withdrawing from active

participation in politics. As a young man, More exhibited a

growing interest in the humanist learning that was
intensifying during his years at Oxford, and his enthusiasm

for Greek texts allegedly threatened to cause a rift

between him and his father. More's desire to continue his
education of Greek, as well as his early epigram and verse

compositions, may indicate his preference for the life of a
scholar and "man of letters" as opposed to that of a public
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servant. His personal desire for a life of solitude and

detachment is further supported by the assertion that he
was considering entering the religious vocation of a monk
or priest. More spent approximately four years, beginning
in roughly 1500,

residing in or nearby the Charterhouse,

the monastery of the Carthusian order in London. While he
spent his time in religious devotion and prayer and

participated in the spiritual exercises of the order,
More's early biographers expressly state that he did so

without any vow.2

Yet, Reynolds concludes that More's

association with the Charterhouse proves: "Thomas More felt
drawn towards the monastic life and tested his vocation as

thoroughly as he could short of entering the novitiate"
(35). However,

as Peter Ackroyd points out,

the practice of

laymen participating in monastic activities was not

unusual: "the Charterhouse was one of the two or three

Carthusian foundations where young men of spiritual
tendency could lodge while at the same time pursuing a
secular career - in the Inns of Court,

Likewise,

for example"

(97).

John Guy emphasizes More's decision to pursue an

2 For discussion of More's "Charterhouse years" see Reynolds, 3436; Ackroyd, 96-97; and Guy, 21-38.
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"active" life in spite of his affiliation with the
Charterhouse during 1500-1504:

The significance of the Charterhouse years is

likely to be that More spent his time trying to
understand the proper relationship between
philosophy and public life. He left the

philosophical debate open-ended, but in practice

opted for a legal career.

(38)

The uncertainty surrounding More's supposed reluctance
to enter the king's service,

or of his preference for

contemplative withdrawal over active participation in

politics, demonstrates the difficulty one faces when trying
to determine which character

(if any)

in Book I is intended

to represent More's actual position in the debate on

counsel. Such a task becomes even more difficult if we

consider that More's first meeting with Prince Henry in

1499 seems to reveal an early and calculated ambition to
gain favor in the eyes of the future king of England. At
the time,

the prince was nine years old and was staying at

the royal palace in Eltham nearby where More and Erasmus

were lodging in Greenwich. Upon meeting the prince, More
presented him with a series of verses which he had composed
to commemorate the special event. Erasmus, who had not been
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informed of the purpose of their visit to Eltham, had no

complimentary verses prepared and was dismayed at having

nothing to offer the prince. As More's meeting with the

young Prince in 1499 suggests, he had long held the clever
and intellectual King Henry VIII in high regard. At the
same time, More had energetically pursued advancement in

his political career. As Guy argues:

More's

'call to counsel' was the climax of a

progression by which he steadily gained the
attention of Henry and Wolsey ... More's legal and
commercial work in London, Bruges and Calais
between 1510 and 1517 was so extensive,

and so

closely linked to the interests of the Crown and
State,

that if it was not at least a limited form

of commitment to a career in politics, what was?

(58)
Whatever reservations More initially may have had about

accepting Wolsey's and Henry's offer,

given his established

commitment to civic service, it was only a matter of time

before the Cardinal and the king succeeded in convincing
him to enter the king's service. By the spring of 1518,

More had become the personal attendant to Henry VIII and
was,

in the words of Erasmus,

totus ... aulicus - "wholly a
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courtier" (qtd. in Ackroyd 121). By the summer of 1518,
More had resigned his appointment as Undersheriff of

London.
More's decision was not an easy or uncomplicated one.

While the role of royal counselor carried with it certain

aspects that would lead him to accept the position, he must
have had grave reservations about it. Certainly one is

liable to experience a measure of conflict over such a

weighty decision. However, any attempt to conclude that
Hythloday reflects More's true stance on the issue of
counsel is clearly problematic. While the debate in Book I

appears, on a superficial level,

to represent a struggle

over the choice between two courses of action, the sense of

conflict seems to have less to do with More's indecisive
commitment to public service or his wavering devotion to

his king.

In fact,

the progress from a legal career to

royal service was customary. Furthermore,

such a path was

not considered incompatible with More's interest in

humanism. As Ackroyd points out, members of the court and

council included other humanists from More's scholarly
circle,

such as Richard Pace and Cuthbert Tunstall. And

Thomas Linacre served as the king's physician, while John
Colet was the court preacher (183). Even Erasmus, who is
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largely considered to be on the side in favor contemplative

withdrawal and idealistic philosophy,

accepted a position

as councilor to Charles the King of Spain, who would later

become Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor. Rather,

the debate in

Book I enables More to demonstrate his acute awareness of
how the decision to serve as a courtier or counselor

inevitably stimulates contradictory sentiments and emotions
and conflicts of interest.

This is the facet of More's "self" that is dramatized
so skillfully in the characters of "More" and Hythloday.

More understood that the complex and varied facets of human

nature often found to reside within a single individual
(emotions,
beliefs)

ambitions, principles, obligations,

desires,

and

rarely converge neatly to provide an obvious

choice totally in favor of one action over another. Often

such a decision will hinge on a dialectic of contradictory

inclinations either in favor of engagement or withdrawal.

More dedicated himself to the king's service in spite of
the fact that such an act would unavoidably result in the

manifestation of these conflicting feelings.

Although Hythloday is allowed to dominate the debate
in Book I,

rather than his arguments in favor of withdrawal

from political life,

it is the theatrical metaphor
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presented by "More" that seems to more accurately reflect

More's perspective, as it is an approach that he applied in
his own life. In his metaphor of life as a stage play,

"More" advises Hythloday: "What part soever you have taken

upon you, play that as well as you can and make the best of
it, and do not, therefore, disturb and bring out of order
the whole matter" (121) . While Hythloday considers this

civil approach to be sly and deceptive, "More" advocates
adapting oneself to a role for the express purpose of

benefiting the commonwealth. And as "More" points out, the
approach advocated by Hythloday would be ineffectual and

absurd. More understood that circumstances in life would
necessarily demand that a person give expression to one
facet of their being and act on the basis of certain

beliefs in a given moment. More's experience in public
administration enabled him to recognize that progress and

reform could not take place if one refused to confront and
engage the tangible, less than ideal outcomes of human

action and behavior.
More demystifies the conventional scholastic

perception of human behavior originating from idealized
foundational ethical principles. While the foundationalist

philosopher is concerned with lofty ideals and is rigidly

117

devoted to the search for "Truth," More acknowledged the

importance of rhetorical techniques,

civility,

such as eloquence and

in practical human affairs. In More's view,

the

"rhetorical man" is educated to cope with the vicissitudes

one inevitably encounters in life. Accordingly, he reveals

life to be a series of dramatic roles assumed for the
purpose of accomplishing a specific objective. He uses

Utopia as a means to explore the constructed nature of
identity - the essential need to deliberately fashion a
distinct self for the purposes of public performance and
interaction.

In his own life, More apparently concluded

that in the role of counselor, he would be in the best

position to advise and persuade the king to act in the
manner best suited to benefit the commonwealth.

According to Stephen Greenblatt,

Utopia reflects

More's self-conscious role-playing - his awareness of his

own mode of engagement within society:
[More] was evidently a canny judge of human
motives, possessed a firm grasp of the complex

network of material interests that underlay the

intricate formalities of Tudor government,

and

knew well how to make his own place within these

formalities.

(15)
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More's survival in Tudor politics depended upon this
awareness of the need to craft a public identity that was

separate from his private identity. Thus More's consistent
decision to pursue an active life in politics meant that he
would do so within the particular persona he had

"fashioned" for himself. Yet More was also a profoundly

reserved man who chose to keep many of his thoughts private
and to leave various of his opinions unexpressed. As

Greenblatt asserts, More's constructed social identity

necessitated a private retreat - a means to distance

himself from his public role as politician,

counselor,

and

statesman:
More's sense of his own distinct identity is

compounded of a highly social role,

fashioned

from his participation in a complex set of
interlocking corporate bodies - law, parliament,

court, city,
reserve,

church,

family - and a secret

a sense of a life elsewhere, unrealized

in public performance.

(41-2)

Greenblatt's notion is significant.

If we consider Utopia

as a reflection of More's self-conscious role-playing,
well as his attempt at "self-cancellation," then we are

relieved from the perplexing and reductive task of
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as

determining which side of the debate represents More's
"true" perspective.

Instead we can view Utopia as a

"playground" wherein More was allowed to explore the

intricate facets that influenced the construction of his
own identity.

Utopia is perhaps an expression of the

complexity of More's inner conflicts - the conflict between

the self that maintained a sincere commitment to political
activity,

and one that perhaps fantasized about the freedom

and relief of withdrawal and isolated philosophical

contemplation.

In this sense,

the character of Hythloday

provides More the means to give expression to his fantasy

of self-cancellation; Hythloday's arguments in favor of
withdrawal provide the necessary justification for

terminating the need to fashion multiple selves - the need
to assume roles in order to function in society.

Greenblatt's concept of Utopia as More's attempt at

self-cancellation further influences our view of Book II.
Rather than struggling to determine whether the discourse
of Utopia is, or is not,

truly a description of More's

ideal commonwealth, we can see it as the progression of the
experiment More begins in Book I. Hythloday proposes the

abolition of private property as the only means to put an
end to the social problems he discussed earlier: "But that
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they may be perfectly cured and brought to an upright
state,

it is not to be hoped for whiles every man is master

of his own to himself"

(125). However, More disagrees

questioning how there can be an abundance of goods if no

man is motivated to work for the purpose of his own
prosperity and increase. Hythloday's argument is based on

the perception that it is private property that provokes

competition among men. Individuality causes people to dwell
on the material,

tangible aspects that differentiate people

one from another. The implication,

according to Greenblatt,

is that "private ownership is causally linked in Utopia to
private ownership of self ... to abolish private property is
to render such self-conscious individuality obsolete"

(38-

9). Utopia's social structure is an extension of this
proposition. Their strictly regimented institutions and

practices,

communal social habits, utilitarian ideology,

even their so-called policy of religious tolerance,

result

in the destruction of the individual. As Greenblatt states,
Utopian society prohibits the development of a distinct and

private self by "eliminating, among other things, most of
the highly particularized corporate categories in which a
man could locate himself and by means of which he could

say,

'I am this and not that'"
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(42). Utopia's limitation

and restriction of seemingly intrinsic personal rights

discourages individuation, and their policy of rigorous
surveillance ensures conformity. Utopia is a society where

all circumstances that necessitate public performance and
the assumption of distinct social roles are removed.
While Greenblatt's analysis provides us a means to

consider Utopia through the perspective of More's

exploration of role-playing and the construction of

identity, it should be remembered that More places the
argument in favor of the abolition of private property, in
order to prevent the development of individual selves, in

the mouth of a "peddler of nonsense." Thus we can also
recognize the extent to which Utopia is also an expression
of More's satiric and lively sense of humor. The existence

of a society structured such that the need to construct

identities for oneself is eliminated is an example of
idealistic thinking; hence, More's exploration of self

cancellation ironically results in the portrayal of a

ludicrous and illogical society. One of the most consistent
features of Utopia is its focus on exposing the limitations

of idealistic thinking. It is this quality that
compellingly demonstrates Utopia's association with satire.
More's familiarity with Lucianic techniques provided him
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with a medium of expression suited to his life-long

fascination with the contradictions that result from
humanity's over-confident belief in appearances and

illusions. Since such confidence is typically considered to
be the consequence of pride,

satire seeks to reduce the

self-inflated perception of humankind. Satiric discourse
commonly draws attention to the fallen,

animalistic aspects

of human beings. At this point, when humans begin to think

of themselves as lofty and enlightened creatures,
first confronted,

they are

and then disgusted and disillusioned,

as

a result of the reflective function of the satiric

portrayal - by the realization of their inherently foul and

grotesque qualities. Accordingly,

lest we begin to accept

the assertion of the Utopians as a rational and idyllic
people, we are presented with an account of their

hierarchical ordering of bodily functions,

their bizarre

premarital customs, and their obsession with bodily
appearance. This obsession with the body makes Hythloday's

admiration of the Utopian lifestyle all the more peculiar.
Hythloday dogmatically argues in Book I in favor of

philosophical contemplation, which implies the otherworldly
notion that the mind should be fully devoted to

contemplating the divine while shunning the material. At
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the same time, he praises the Utopian's method of

rationalization and their moral philosophy, which appears
deeply obsessed with all things bodily and physical.

The humanist recovery of Menippean forms paralleled
the foregrounding of an educational program based on
rhetoric. The emphasis on rhetorical technique provided a

practical approach appropriately suited to the cultural and
political climate emerging in early modern Europe. "More's"
advocation of a civic approach to counsel is an approach to

political involvement that was beginning to replace the
scholastic belief in foundational ideals - the kind of
inflexible stability Hythloday describes as the foundation
of Utopian society. Yet More was not only targeting the

scholastic proponents of philosophical ideals. The ironic
commentary in Utopia is also subtly self-reflexive.

Humanists were extremely conscious of their social roles as

intellectual innovators and disseminators of cultural

practices and beliefs. As a result, Scott Blanchard
explains, humanist scholars customarily turned to the

conventions of Menippean satire as a means for exploring
the implications of the immense humanist project:

Menippean satire is a genre both for and about

scholars; it is an immensely learned form that is
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at the same time paradoxically anti-intellectual.
If its master of ceremonies is the humanist as

wise fool,

its audience is a learned community

whose members need to be reminded ... of the

depravity of their overreaching intellects,
the limits of human understanding.

of

(14)

More's own use of the Menippean form allowed him to
comment,

at least indirectly, on the very humanist mode of

thought in which he was deeply invested. One of the
fundamental principles of humanism was its belief in the

potential of humankind. As Arthur F. Kinney explains,

humanists became certain that through education, moral and
ethical development,

and intellectual progress,

they could

"fashion and refashion and refashion themselves," and

accordingly society would follow; thus "being educable, man

might also be perfectible"

(5). More was an enthusiastic

supporter of educational reform and likewise ensured that
learning would have a principal role in his own home,

for

his daughters as well as his son. Yet More was also

confronted by what Alistair Fox calls,

the "fracture" at

the core of Christian humanism:
On the one hand their humanist enthusiasms
tempted them to believe that men could aspire to
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cultivate their natures and society with an

expectation of attaining happiness in this world.
On the other hand, Christianity and the findings
of their own realistic perception of contemporary

circumstances,

instructed them to accept that

human nature was irremediably sinful.

(105)

The result of this "fracture" in regard to the humanist
objective of refashioning society is that any attempt to
realize the vision of an ideal society will ultimately be

frustrated. Though it is unlikely that More intended Utopia
to serve as a literal model of social reform,

it did

perhaps serve as a means for More to express his

conflicting feelings about the aspirations of the humanist
project,

and in so doing, he presents an alleged model

society in order to expose the limitations of any
idealistic policy of social reform. However, at the same
time, the recognizable absurdity of Utopian society

illustrates the humanist notion that the process of reform
must begin at the individual level rather than the

institutional level. Ultimately,

the education of the

individual is upheld as the most important step,

the achievement of a perfect society,

then at least in the

hope that society could be much improved.
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if not for

As the multi-faceted nature of Utopia demonstrates,

More was highly skilled in the art of ironic discourse. Yet
More's use of comic irony was not a trait specific to

himself; as Fox explains,

the literature of the early

Renaissance was consistently concerned with politics,

either directly or indirectly (3). As a result,
irony for the purposes of criticism, commentary,

the use of
and

argument emerged as a trademark technique of Renaissance
literature. This due to the fact that many writers of the
period served as courtiers and in various other political
and administrative offices. As a result,

Tudor literature is,

Fox states,

"early

above all, dramatized and indirect"

(3). The Tudor age was turbulent and problematic, hence

fictive literature produced by writers of the time relied
upon dramatized scenes and dialogues and reflected their

interest in self-preservation. According to Fox,
was "full of tensions, ambiguities,

the age

and paradoxes,

and

these are precisely the aspects of life that their
literature dramatizes"

(4). For instance,

the critique of

European society in Book I demonstrates Utopia's strategy
of indirectness as it comes from the mouth of Hythloday

("speaker of nonsense")

rather than from the mouth of

"More." More's experience as a lawyer and as Undersheriff
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gave him a comprehensive understanding of civic and
commercial matters as well as a specialized knowledge of
London's societal and economic affairs. Consequently, his

grasp of the difficulty and complexity underlying farreaching social problems is demonstrated in Utopia. While
More deliberately problematizes the issue of Hythloday's
reliability,

the critique in Book I illustrates the

systemic nature of social problems. Accordingly,

Hythloday's discourse begins with considering the issue of

the appropriate punishment for stealing, which leads to the
examination of various other issues - all of which affect

each other. Hythloday's observation that the problem of
thievery remains rampant in spite of the harsh punishment

that is meted out as consequence can be recognized as an

accurate assessment. The continued occurrences of theft
then are indicative of a greater problem involving the

underlying issues of pride,

greed,

and ostentation of

society. As Hythloday's critique demonstrates,
problems affect the body generally,

social

like a disease,

and

must be treated as such. Rather than mitigating the

symptoms of social problems with innumerable or excessively
harsh laws - for instance, punishing thieves with death it is only by treating the disease as a whole that society
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can be returned to good health. This of course leads to
Hythloday's radical proposal of the complete elimination of

private property:
Yea, and whiles you go about to do your cure on
one part, you shall make bigger the sore of

another part, so the help of one causeth
another's harm, forasmuch as nothing can be given
to anyone, unless it be taken from another.

(125)

At this point, the reader is poised for Hythloday's
impending discourse of Utopia, which brings with it
descriptions of ridiculous social practices. More's ability

to move from serious social commentary to comically absurd

material functions as a way to obscure his genuine

sentiments and makes his social critique less threatening,
thereby limiting any potential consequences.

The folly of European society is not limited to the
dialogue of Book I. We can also recognize distinctly

European practices in Book II in Hythloday's account of the
Anemolian ambassadors as well as in the discussion of the

Utopian's views of laws and the honoring of treatises.
According to Hythloday, the Utopians object to the making
and renewing of treaties since other nations are constantly

breaking them. Thus treaties are completely ineffective in
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maintaining harmonious relations between countries because

rulers lack the virtue necessary to abide by them.

Likewise, they consider it unjust to expect citizens to
accept and obey laws that are impossible to understand:

They have but few laws,

for to people so instruct

and institute very few suffice. Yea, this thing
they chiefly reprove among other nations,

that

innumerable books of laws and expositions which

either be in number more than can be able to be
read or else blinder and darker than that any man
may well understand them.
However,

(173)

this observation regarding the making of vague and

unintelligible laws brings about an amusing comment

concerning lawyers: "Furthermore, they utterly exclude and
banish all attorneys, proctors,

and sergeants-at-the-law,

which craftily handle matters and subtly dispute of the

laws"

(173). It may initially seem contradictory for More

to criticize lawyers and render them superfluous,
own legal career. However,

given his

it is another example of More's

ironic sense of humor. Who better to mock the vice of
lawyers than one who is thoroughly familiar with the

conventional role and reputation of lawyers in society? Of

course,

this account of the Utopian's disdain for European
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practices comes just before the description of their policy
concerning warfare. In addition to some of their other

practices, such as their ordering of bodily functions, and
their view of marital relationships, readers of Utopia are

likely to find the description of the Utopian's treacherous
behavior in military affairs vile and repellent. And this

is clearly what More intended - for the reader to be
repelled by the behavior of the Utopians, but to see the

parallels between their society and this invented one - for
the reader to recognize aspects of her/his tangible society

within the account of an imaginary one.
As much as Utopia appears to be, on some level, a
reflection of More's inner self, More deliberately uses
irony and comic elements to distance himself from the work.

More maintains his ambiguous position all the way up to the
very end of the book. Following Hythloday's peroration at
the close of Book II, "More" offers us a rare glimpse of

inferiority:
Thus when Raphael had made an end of his tale,
though many things came to my mind which in the

manners and laws of that people seemed to be

instituted and founded for no good reason, not

only in the fashion of their chivalry, and in
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other of their laws, but also, yea and chiefly,

in that which is the principal foundation of all
their ordinances, that is to say, in the
community of their life and living, without any

occupying of money, by the which thing only all

nobility, magnificence, worship, honor, and
majesty, the true ornaments and honors, as the

common opinion is, of a commonwealth, utterly be
overthrown and destroyed ... (201)

Whether we are completely persuaded by Hythloday's

discourse or not, evidently "More" is unable to bring
himself to fully endorse Hythloday's assertions. While
"More's" statement, that "nobility, magnificence, worship,
honor, and majesty" serve as the true ornaments of any

nation, would seem to contradict More's widely reported

contempt for pride and ostentation, the statement should be

considered in relation to Utopia's ironic and humorous
spirit.3 Rather than offering us a clear indication of

where, or with whom, our sentiments should align, More
3 This is in particular response to J.H. Hexter's discussion of
this statement as More's "frivolous defense." In his book, More's
Utopia: Biography of an Idea, he argues the following: "Not one
of those contemporaries would have maintained for a moment that
what mattered in a commonwealth were splendor, magnificence, and
majesty. What mattered to them were order, harmony, justice,
peace, and prosperity" (36-7).
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allows the conversation to drop off and remain open-ended.
More's remarkable ability to maintain this level of
ambiguity serves to identify Utopia as an exemplar of

humanist, rhetorical discourse. More insists on continuing
the process of education and intellectual development by
asking the reader to grapple with the multiple and

conflicting implications involved when considering the
arguments of "More" and Hythloday, and when contemplating

the policies and practices of Utopian society. Thus Utopia

stays true to the dynamics of humanist fiction in which the

aim, as Kinney states, is "not merely to entertain or
challenge the reader, but to instruct him. It is another

event that can discipline and cultivate - teach - the mind"
(55).

At the same time, More understood the limits of

human rationality, namely that the fallen state of human

nature would never be able to adequately bring the vision

of an ideal into existence. The discourse of Utopian
society serves as a candid exploration of the limitations
and contradictions that are inherent in humanist thinking.

However, our recognition of this facet of Utopia should not
diminish our understanding of More's commitment to

humanism. More was himself an idealist in many ways and
accordingly comprehended the value of humanism's idealistic
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pursuits.- For More,

and arguably for humanists in general,

the ability to conceive of a perfect state of existence on
earth,

in spite of the inability to realize it,

is one of

the only ways to provoke change for the purpose of
improving society. As Fox explains from the perspective of
humanist thinking: "If men could not adequately

conceptualize the state that their idealism prompted them
to seek,
earth"

far less could they ever expect to realize it on

(102). In other words,

reform of any kind cannot

occur if humans are incapable of envisioning a better

condition of existence.

There is no question that More chooses to deliberately

obscure his position in relation to the issues discussed in

Utopia; he refuses to offer us any clear indication of his
intent. As is demonstrated through the multivalent nature
of Utopia,

and as Guy so adequately states,

the greatest

paradox about Thomas More is: "his ability to dissimulate

and speak the truth simultaneously"

(58). However,

it is

telling that More chooses to conclude the discourse between
"More" and Hythloday with a final reinforcement of a civil
philosophical approach. "More," who has had ample

opportunity to observe Hythloday's temperament,
against disagreeing with his assertions openly:
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decides

... because I knew that he was weary of talking and
was not sure whether he could abide that anything

should be said against his mind, specially

remembering that he had reprehended this fault in

others, which be afraid lest they should seem not
to be wise enough, unless they could find some

fault in other men's inventions, therefore, I,
praising both their institutions and his

communication, took him by the hand and led him
in to supper, saying that we would choose another

time to weigh and examine the same matters and
talk with him more at large therein.

(201)

Rather, "More" reinforces his argument regarding the
essential and practical need for role-playing in social

situations even in his interaction with the idealistic
traveler. Apparently, given Hythloday's intolerant and

dogmatic behavior, there is no other way to courteously

conclude a discussion with him than to assume the role of
someone who agrees with his rigid point of view. But
Hythloday is not merely an idealist, he is one who claims

to have identified, and hence has defined, the ideal
commonwealth. As such, he sees no need to seek it out, or

to strive to bring about the improvement of any other
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society, hence his argument in favor of withdrawal, and his
inclination toward disinterest and inactivity. Through

Utopia's complex structure, ironic characteristics, and
remarkable multivalence, More skillfully exposes the
limitations of rigid,

idealistic thinking,

and

simultaneously demonstrates that the pursuit of the

ineffable and unattainable ideal is necessary to sustain
our concerted efforts toward progress and reform.
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